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1. Introduction 
In summer 2010, roughly about a year prior to writing this Introduction, I was sitting in a 
quite well crowded lecture room, on the final day of the Helsinki Summer Seminar on 
Human Rights, having trouble concentrating. This was not because the lecture would have 
been boring — on the contrary, it was very gripping and quite thought-provoking.  Nor was 
it because of the heavy rain pummeling the skylight window of the lecture room. What kept 
distracting my attention, instead, was that I could not get over the idea that the topic of the 
lecture, trafficking in human beings, had nothing to do with human rights (their past, present, 
and future, to be precise), the theme of the seminar.  The reader should understand that this 
was the first lecture I had ever had on trafficking and I had no prior knowledge on the 
subject. I did not, therefore, doubt the suffering of the victims — we had actually been 
shown the movie Lilja 4-ever during the seminar, which should prove my point for all 
readers that have seen said film — but, without real understanding of the issue, trafficking 
struck me as a pretty standard, albeit transnational and exceptionally horrible crime. I simply 
could not see where human rights would come into play. The act of trafficking violated 
several of the human rights of the victim, sure, but what crime does not? 
Now, after having spent some months researching the topic, I can see that my initial 
reactions to the topic were quite naïve. Without real knowledge on the issue, I simply could 
not really grasp all the nuances and levels of the problem. My view of the matter was, 
therefore, too simplistic to allow me to picture all the phases of the process. But still, even 
after this research, I’m haunted by the idea that some of my questions were actually valid, 
although badly framed. Perhaps it was exactly because of my naivety, and for not having 
exposed to any discourses surrounding the topic, that I could intuitively reach some 
problems surrounding the anti-trafficking phenomenon? 
It is my intention, in this thesis, to finally confront those haunting feelings and to paint a 
satisfying picture of the trafficking phenomenon. It should be remarked, however, that this is 
not a thesis about trafficking per se. Although the bulk of the thesis does indeed deal with 
the trafficking quagmire,1 it is really about human rights, and their proliferation — although 
through a single, particular case (because of the limitations set for a master’s thesis). It is 
only through the critical discourse surrounding the expansion of the human rights 
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 I chose the term ‘quagmire’, utilized by James Hathaway (Hathaway, James C, The Human Rights Qugmire 
of “Human Trafficking”, 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 2008-2009, 1-59), since it pictures perfectly, 
in my opinion, the complicated nature of the crime, the measures against it, and the discourse surrounding it.  
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phenomenon that the question that arose in the lecture room a year ago finally receives a 
sensible frame.  
At this point a clarification regarding terminology is, perhaps, in order. What do I mean by 
the ‘expansion of the human rights phenomenon’, exactly — or even with the individual 
term ‘human rights phenomenon’? Following Miia Halme-Tuomisaari, the human rights 
phenomenon could be defined as being constituted of three elements: discourse, community 
and artifacts.2 As Halme-Tuomisaari demonstrates, all of these three elements have expanded 
significantly since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),3 
producing the expansion of the human rights phenomenon:“an infinite community of NGOs, 
experts, policy makers, volunteers, educators, politicians and ordinary citizens has emerged 
around the [human rights] discourse”;4 international human rights instruments, policies, 
institutions, and other artifacts have proliferated;5 and “these developments have also 
dramatically expanded the human rights discourse.”6 
What is interesting about this expansion is how rapidly it has occurred. While traces of rights 
language can be tracked from the concept of dominium used by Catholic scholars (perhaps 
most importantly those of the School of Salamanca7), through the enlightenment era natural 
law theorists, to the rights of man presented in the U.S. and French declarations — and some 
protectors of the human rights language, adopting a more philosophical approach towards 
human rights, are even ready to claim that similar concepts appear in the history of most 
cultural traditions around the world —8 the common opinion seems to be that the 
contemporary human rights were born with the UDHR in 1949, and have been proliferating 
ever since. But even this story of the development of human rights, ignited not much more 
than half-a-century ago, can be put into question. It is certainly true that the contemporary 
human rights were formulated in the drafting process of the UDHR, or rather in the tireless 
and groundbreaking work of countless wartime and interwar era activists, publicists, lawyers 
and NGOs,9 but the declaration did not launch an immediate triumph of human rights. 
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 Halme-Tuomisaari, Miia, Human Rights in Action: Learning Expert Knowledge, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden and Boston, 2010 at 7-8. 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
4
 Halme-Tuomisaari 2010 at 8. 
5
 Ibid. at 8-9. 
6
 Ibid. 2010 at 9. 
7
 See Koskenniemi, Martti, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 2011, 1-36. 
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 See Hellsten, Sirkku K., Human Rights in Africa: From Communitarian Values to Utilitarian Practice, 5 
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According to Samuel Moyn, the UDHR was more a burial of war-time dreams than a birth of 
a new era. “The world looked up for a moment”, writes Moyn, “[but t]hen it resumed its 
postwar agendas.”10 Not only was the non-binding character of the UDHR a big 
disappointment, but human rights also seemed irrelevant in the heating competition between 
capitalism and communism.11 
”The drama of human rights is”, then, writes Moyn, “that they emerged in the 1970s 
seemingly from nowhere.”12 In contrast to the story of the birth of the human rights 
phenomenon as a grand awakening of the mankind as a response to the Nazi atrocities, 
human rights came to bloom as other utopias fell — when people lost their faith to Cold War 
politics, human rights emerged to fill the ideological void.13 Not only did a return to morals 
seem like a pure, fresh option for ordinary citizens after the soiled and failed capitalism and 
communism, giving birth finally to the social movement that was lacking in the aftermath of 
the war, but the anti-colonialist movement was withering too, allowing international lawyers, 
also, to look at human rights from a fresh angle, without the fear of dangerous radical self-
determination.14 And after its (re-)emergence, the expansion of the human rights 
phenomenon was explosive, rather than steady. The drafting processes of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights (ICCPR15 and ICESCR16) finally came to an end and the 
documents started to gain ratifications. New instruments were prepared at an increasing 
speed,17 NGOs mushroomed,18 and the term ‘human rights’ started to find its way into the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1998 at 91, 110-112; Mazower, 
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speeches of politicians and the pages of newspapers.19 In only three decades we came to the 
point where the Nobel peace laureate Elie Wiesel could, in 1999, proclaim that human rights 
have become a “worldwide secular religion."20 
What makes this expansion relevant for my thesis, however, is not so much the speed of the 
expansion — although it certainly gives it an interesting framework — but the critical 
discourse surrounding it. It seems that the expansion is a double-edged sword. The success 
of human rights certainly seems like a wonder worth applauding for. From women’s human 
rights to racial struggles and LGBTQ rights, human rights have fueled countless (often 
victorious) emancipatory struggles and have forced governments to change their policies 
towards a more humane direction, achieving freedoms that one could have only dreamt of 
only couple of decades ago, and — as cheesy as it may sound — have truly made the world a 
better place (at least in the ‘Global North’). But even so, there has arisen some critical voices 
that warn us of the possible unwanted consequences of this progress.  
One of the most prominent critics of the expansion is Costas Douzinas, who has famously 
proclaimed that we are witnessing the ‘End of Human Rights’.21 At the core of the problem 
is the necessary universality of human rights. Only as universal, writes Duncan Kennedy, 
can human rights be something else than ‘ordinary’ laws, mediators between law and 
politics, rules and ideology, sein and sollen.22 But this requirement has two inevitable 
consequences: human rights must remain abstract in character, for only then can they be 
accepted globally in different cultures and different contexts; and they cannot have any 
hierarchy, since a hierarchically superior right would inevitably come to conflict with all the 
other rights, rendering them all but inalienable and universal.23 This inescapably abstract 
nature of human rights means, at least in theory, that every claim, desire or interest can be 
translated into human rights language.24 For Douzinas — according to whom rights operate 
as the petit objet a, borrowed from Lacanian psychoanalysis, that represents the object of an 
unreachable desire, but at the same time represent lack and prevent the desire from being 
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filled (since law is always a compromise and no right can therefore completely achieve one’s 
aims) — this means rights claims are doomed to proliferate ad infinitum.25 Every desire that 
becomes law as a consequence of a successful rights struggle, charges the initially empty 
signifier (in this case the word) ‘human’ with a new meaning, turning it into a floating 
signifier that every political movement wants to harness as a part of its campaign, using it to 
claim new, more specialized rights.26 Eventually this will lead, according to Douzinas, to a 
point — and we are already reaching this point in his dark prophecy — where the raison 
d’être of rights is completely lost: human rights are meant to defend the most inalienable 
rights of every human-being, but when everything is a human right, it is completely 
impossible to decide what these most inalienable rights are (rights are, by definition, 
hierarchically equal, after all).27    
A particularly concern for Douzinas is the bureaucratization of human rights. Rights are, for 
Douzinas, fundamentally a way for protest, protecting individuals against absolutism by 
restraining the power of the sovereign.28 But as human rights came to dominate legal and 
political discourse, states and other political actors had to change their attitude towards them. 
Governments came to adopt the rights language, fusing it into mainstream politics and 
administration — in other words, bureaucratizing it.  At this point, of course, the application 
of rights came to rely more and more on expert knowledge. This is natural, as both Jarna 
Petman and Martti Koskenniemi explain, for rights — like any rules that arise as a 
compromise reached in a negotiation process — are always under- or over-inclusive.29 They 
cover things they should not and leave important things uncovered: it is impossible for the 
legislators or drafters to accurately predict what the future might bring. “To govern this 
uncertain future”, writes Petman, “exceptions and abstractions will be needed”,30 which, of 
course, creates indeterminacy. To assure that the indeterminate rules are interpreted and 
applied in an efficient, reasonable way, experts are needed.31 But then the question of 
legitimacy appears. How do we know that the experts are making the rights decisions? Rules 
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are needed to regulate the work of experts and limit their power. But these rules will also end 
up being indeterminate, meaning that more experts are needed to apply them. The legitimacy 
problem reappears, of course, and more experts are again needed. As Petman explains, “[t]he 
move from function to rules to indeterminacy to contextualized expert decisions will start 
again — only to start again. There will be no place to stop.”32 
Human rights have, therefore, as a consequence of this process, been, ‘hijacked’ by 
governments and bureaucrats, claims Douzinas. There is nothing bad about the 
bureaucratization of human rights, as such, however, in contrast to what Douzinas is 
suggesting. The bureaucratization means that a human rights struggle has been successful 
enough to influence governmental policies, and as a consequence of this success the 
implementation of said rights has become more effective. But just like the expansion of the 
human rights phenomenon in general, bureaucratization, too, is a double edged sword. 
Human rights do not lose any of their open-endedness in the hands of experts and 
bureaucrats. Instead, in order to be able to solve complicated rights conflict, authorities are 
forced to create “complex balancing practices and rights-exceptions schemes that defer to 
general considerations of administrative policy, public interest, economic efficiency, and so 
on — precisely the kind of criteria that rights were once introduced to limit”, as put by 
Koskenniemi.33 Through bureaucratization, human rights lose, then, their protest function (or 
at least some of it). They risk becoming a tool of the sovereign, a bedfellow of positivism.34 
At this point, human rights actually become dangerous, according to Douzinas, for they are, 
as he puts it, “not just restraints on power; they are tools of the new society of control.”35 
Human rights can be used to discipline, exclude and dominate. They teach individuals to 
solve conflicts in a certain, legalized way and shape the thoughts of the right-bearer. 
Disciplinary technologies, including human rights, define some behaviour as normal and 
other as deviant. Anne Orford has demonstrated how this aspect of human rights serves to 
produce the human capital necessary to reproduce markets,36 The link between human rights 
and markets is also made by Wendy Brown, who states that the rights language “stands as a 
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critique of dissonant political projects, converges neatly with the requisites of liberal 
imperialism and global free trade, and legitimizes both as well.”37 
This split nature of the expansion of the human rights phenomenon — as a successful and 
necessary process for the upgraded implementation of rights, on the one hand, and as a 
theoretical risk for the essence of rights, on the other — shall, then, provide a frame for my 
study on the human rights approach to trafficking in human beings. It is my aim, in this 
thesis, to understand why THB has been made a human rights issue, and, more 
fundamentally, to ponder how such an approach really benefits the victims of the crime. It is 
clear that the victims should be provided all possible help, but do the dark clouds summoned 
by Douzinas shade this process as well?   
It is the first question, namely “why and how has the anti-trafficking campaign been 
translated into human rights language”, that I shall begin with in Chapter 2, after setting 
some basics of the trafficking quagmire. Regarding this question, I am guided especially by 
Sally Engle Merry, who has significantly illuminated the translation process of human rights 
in her research on human rights and gender violence.38 As we come to see, translation is a 
complicated process also in the case of trafficking, driven in large part by the will of 
activists, publicists, NGOs, and other actors to improve the situation of the victims, but also 
by political, structural and even economical aims. After arriving to this messy conclusion, it 
is necessary, however, to take one more detour, in order to be able to provide an adequate 
assessment of the human rights approach, and study how the human rights approach is 
crystallized into concrete claims on behalf of the victims. While it is clear that the act of 
trafficking violates several human rights of the victims, what makes trafficking any different 
from other crimes, such as murder, battery or theft? Should trafficking be dealt with some 
specialized human rights instruments or do the existing, more general human rights treaties 
provide adequate protection? What does the ‘human rights approach to human trafficking’ 
mean, exactly, and how can human rights improve the situation of the victims? 
As we will come to see, the human rights approach to trafficking, seeking still its final form, 
consists of several, only loosely connected, factors or claims. Although all of the claims 
include important insights regarding the trafficking phenomenon, it is my claim that the 
human rights approach is judicially most relevant in the case of mistreatment, especially 
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deportation, of the victims of trafficking, whereas the other claims have some critical 
problems from a purely legal perspective. In Chapter 3, I adopt, then, the ‘victim’s’ 
perspective and ponder the reasons that could explain the poor treatment of the victims 
despite the good intentions of many authorities and the involvement of many relevant actors 
in the anti-trafficking movement. I reject any conspiracy theories and argue that the only 
way to understand the paradoxical difference between the intentions of the relevant actors 
and the end-results of their actions is to adopt a Foucauldian perspective of (bio)power and 
governmentality.39 From a biopolitical perspective the victims of trafficking can be seen as a 
threat to the population — a threat that must be eliminated either by assimilating them to the 
main population with the help of disciplinary techniques, or by excluding them completely 
from the society.  This biopolitical aim is accomplished through an impenetrable net of 
seemingly insignificant practices and discourses that not even the participants are aware of. 
As a result of these practices and discourses, trafficking victims become ‘invisible’ and 
therefore subject to deportation as (risky) illegal immigrants, turning them into ‘bare life’ in 
the Agambenian sense, represented by the homo sacer, who cannot be sacrificed, but does 
not enjoy the protection of the society and its laws.40  The question that must be raised, 
before concluding the thesis in Chapter 4, is then: if the society has turned against the 
victims, without the authorities even noticing it themselves, could human rights provide an 
escape from this situation? 
2. Trafficking in human beings and human rights 
2.1 Not really an introduction: The birth of the anti-trafficking campaign 
The 19th century was not an easy time to exist as a young woman in England. Radical shifts 
in the structure of the society and the rapid spread of capitalism brought not only new 
exciting possibilities and ideas but also insecurity, anxiety, and even distress. In this context, 
many girls and women were forced — or allowed, depending on the person — to 
dramatically alter their lives and to find new ways of livelihood and survival. But, 
simultaneously with these changes, new techniques of control and paternalistic ideologies 
also emerged. As Nickie Roberts explains: ”[m]ass trade unionism, revolutionary ideologies, 
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the sexually liberal culture of the urban poor, and the entry en masse of young girls into the 
labour force, all combined to throw elements of the bourgeoisie into a panic: the very fabric 
of the middle-class social order was apparently at threat.”41 In response to this threat, Roberts 
continues, “the middle class turned to its own tradition of social discipline, the puritanical 
control of sexuality and worship of the […] patriarchal nuclear family.”42  
It is in this context that the campaign against trafficking in human beings — or the ‘white 
slavery’, as it was known back then — first appeared. This is not to say that trafficking was 
born in the 19th century, of course (although the increased migration could have accelerated 
the business), for as John Piccarelly demonstrates, trafficking, as one form of ‘unfree labor’, 
can be seamlessly connected to the history of slavery, of which the best known ‘chattel 
slavery’ is only one part of (although it is extremely important to notice that slave-like 
conditions fit only a very small portion of trafficking victims, whereas many are rather 
exploited migrants).43  But it is at this time that the practice finally captured the attention of 
the middle classes and the elite. To understand this grand awakening — as well as modern 
discussion on trafficking, I would claim — it is necessary to start with the obvious enemy of 
this Victorian utopia: the prostitute.  
For the Victorians, the ‘whore’ represented everything that was wrong and dangerous in the 
world: an autonomous working woman, free of moralistic sexual control.44 But there was 
more. By the mid-19th century, the doctors and public officials had come to assess venereal 
diseases as a serious threat to the British population. A special concern was the state of the 
armed forces.45 The prostitutes, therefore, constituted a double threat: not only did they 
endanger the morale of the population, but they also jeopardized its health by spreading 
diseases. Not surprisingly, then, soon followed the anti-prostitute measures. To Victorian 
officials, regulation was the favored solution. Already in the 1850s repressive measures had 
hit prostitutes hard, but the real turn was the first Contagious Diseases Act (CDA), in 1864, 
that intended to root out sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers. Not surprisingly, 
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prostitutes, instead of soldiers, whose manhood could have been violated by examinations, 
were blamed for the venereal disease problem and became the target of the measures.46 The 
metaphor of pollution was used to describe the prostitutes as carriers of infection and as a 
dreadful danger to the society.47 The first Act provided for the compulsory examination of 
prostitutes in British naval ports and garrison towns, but soon the CDAs had been extended 
well beyond their initially defined limits.48 “[A] police morals squad was set up, with the 
power to stop any woman and define [and register] her as a ‘common prostitute’.”49 Once 
registered, the women had to undergo medical examination that often had more to do with 
disciplining and demonstrating the state’s power of access to the women’s bodies than a 
medical procedure. If found infected, women were detained to Lock Hospitals where they 
were again subjected to extremely harsh discipline and arbitrary regulation.50 
But the prostitutes had their defenders, too. The harsh measures of the state officials started 
to raise critique in the late 1860s and had become a considerable force by the 1880s.51 At the 
forefront were middle-class feminists, most importantly a woman named Josephine Butler. 
In 1869 the feminists published a Ladies’ Protest that condemned the Acts that gave the 
police absolute power over women and “punish the sex who are the victims of vice and leave 
unpunished the sex who are the main causes both of the vice and its dreaded 
consequences”.52 The protest movement was haunted by serious conflicts of interests, 
however. Not only were there gaps and disagreements between sexes and social classes,53 
but, more importantly, the agendas of the protesters did not often fit those of their alleged 
beneficiaries, i.e. the prostitutes. The ultimate goal of the feminists and other repealers was 
to get rid of prostitution altogether. Furthermore, and partly because of the above, the claims 
and actions of the feminists never really challenged the Victorian stereotypes. In fact, horror 
stories about young girls forced into prostitution made discussion about voluntary 
prostitution and women’s right to labor impossible. These stories of innocent girls as the 
victims of the lusts of men also raised the interest of conservative, especially Christian, 
groups, which soon led to hijacking and de-radicalization of the movement.54  
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It was no surprise, then, that soon the anti-CDAs campaign had transformed into a social 
purity campaign.55 In fact, Josephine Butler herself played a significant — although possibly 
unintentional — part in this transformation, having founded the Social Purity Alliance in 
1873.56 It is in this context that the anti-trafficking movement finally emerged. To keep up 
the momentum that the feminist movement had managed to establish, the social purity 
movement needed a new topic to rally against after the CDAs had mostly been suspended  
— one that would benefit from the achievements of the feminists but that could gain a wider 
and less homogenous audience.57 Enter ‘white slave trade’. The increased migration of 
women had given birth to horror stories of young girls being drugged and abducted, only to 
“wake up in some foreign brothel, where they were subject to the pornographic whims of 
sadistic, non-white pimps and brothel masters.”58 This new scandal was the answer to the 
prayers of the purists. Not only did the early anti-trafficking campaign include the feminist 
agenda against the exploitation of women by men, but it was rallied for the benefit of 
innocent victims (instead of ‘filthy prostitutes’) and against a much more vague and distant 
enemy (the savage and exotic non-white — or, at the very least, foreign —pimps). In 1880 
Alfred Dyer published his pamphlet, The European Slave Trade in English Girls, which 
claimed that masses of British girls were abducted and forced to work in brothels in 
Brussels. This led to the formation of the London Committee for Suppressing the Traffick in 
British Girls and the new campaign was underway.59  
But even though it was true that there were English prostitutes working in brothels in 
Brussels, many of them had in reality migrated voluntarily to escape the British regulation 
system. Beside the abusive practices described above, the CDAs had made the life of 
prostitutes very difficult by isolating them from the society and by transforming casual 
prostitution into a specific professional class. Before the CDAs, most prostitutes were young 
and single: prostitution was simply a way to survive for a while. But in the post-CDAs 
atmosphere, it was increasingly difficult to escape from prostitution. Removed from their 
neighborhoods into red-light districts, the prostitutes were no longer capable of returning to 
the routines of everyday life, but were categorized forever as ‘whores’ and therefore 
excluded from the rest of the population —in other words, trapped.60 Transformed into a 
social purity movement and mixed into Victorian standards, the anti-CDAs movement was 
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unable to provide help. Therefore, single young women without jobs were forced to search 
livelihood somewhere else, unless they wanted prostitution to become a career. It is true that 
many of them did find coercion in Brussels and elsewhere: the reformers did base their 
evidence for the white slave trade on the actual international migration of prostitutes. But 
just like modern day trafficking in human beings, as we will come to see, the trafficking 
business seldom had anything to do with the sensational stories of white slave trafficking. 
With the internationalization of capitalism and the increased regulation of prostitution in 
many countries, prostitutes were on the move to escape poverty and oppression in their home 
countries, which made them easy targets of exploitation.61 In some sense, then, the campaign 
managed to create what it was trying to eradicate — a fate that we must keep in mind in the 
modern campaign against trafficking, in order not to renew our mistakes. 
It would be unfair to only criticize the hard work done by the anti-trafficking campaigners, 
however. Their achievements must be acknowledged as well. Perhaps the most important 
one is the much needed legislation on the issue. After its ignition in Britain, the fear of well-
established underground networks spread fast and soon reached Europe62 and the United 
States63 as well, forcing the powers-that-be to finally respond. In 1902 representatives of 
several governments met to draft an international instrument to put an end to white slave 
traffic. The International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic was 
ratified by twelve nations in 1904, followed soon by other, updated documents in the sphere 
of League of Nations.64 Finally, the UN Convention for Suppression of Traffic in Persons 
and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others65 was adopted in 1949. When the UN 
Convention was drafted, the buzz concerning the issue had already faded, however.66 The 
closing of borders in the world wars era had significantly hindered the trafficking business, 
and the wars had directed the attention of the public to other matters.  
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2.2. The real introduction: Criminal law and human rights approaches to 
trafficking  
It was not until the easing in the atmosphere of the Cold War politics allowed increased 
international tourism and female migration in the 1970s that the issue arose again into public 
knowledge (much like in the case of human rights). Since then, however, trafficking in 
human beings, accelerated by the fall of the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavian crisis and 
globalization, has evolved into one of the most talked about global criminal concerns of the 
twenty-first century. As explained by one publicist on the field, “it is cast by political 
leaders, alongside terrorism and drug trafficking, as one of the three ‘evils’ that haunts the 
globe, and it has become the subject for much academic research, policy work, and action in 
a wide variety of disciplines and fields.”67 
In 2000, the newly found attention towards trafficking finally gave birth to a new 
international document on the matter, when the drafting process of the 2000 Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was 
finished.68 The Trafficking Protocol (TP), or ‘Palermo Protocol’, was a long-awaited 
addition to the field, patching the holes and problems left by the outdated treaties of the early 
20th century. As Kalen Fredette writes, ”the Protocol offers the most comprehensive, 
explicitly articulated international legal framework on human trafficking and overcomes 
many of the limitations of its predecessors.”69 It adopts the so-called 3-P approach to 
trafficking, emphasizing not only the prosecution of traffickers, but also the prevention of 
trafficking and the protection of victims.70 Regarding protection, the Protocol requires 
Member States "to protect the privacy and identity of victims";71  to provide victims 
information about relevant proceedings and ensure that the victims are represented in such 
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proceedings;72 to provide victims with needed care and assistance;73 and to secure the safety 
of the victims while they are in its territory.74 States should also consider “measures that 
permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, 
in appropriate cases”,75 and to facilitate the repatriation of the victims.76 Regarding 
prevention, “States Parties shall endeavor to undertake measures such as research, 
information and mass media campaigns and social and economic initiatives to prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons.”77 States are also required to cooperate in the areas of law 
enforcement and border security and to control identity and travel documents.78 
Perhaps most importantly, the Protocol provides, for the first time, a globally accepted 
definition of trafficking in human beings. According to Article 3a of the Protocol:  
“[t]rafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.79  
The article then goes on to explain that: 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs;80  
The Trafficking Protocol “supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.”81 It is, therefore, according to its Article 4, limited to trafficking that 
involves organized crime and includes an international element, i.e. cases where the victim is 
transported form one state to another. While the definition in Article 3a does not actually 
require either, and it is generally accepted that THB is possible also within a single state,82 
there seems to exist a consensus in the academia that the Protocol adopts primarily a 
criminal law approach to trafficking.  As Elizabeth Bruch puts it, ”[a]ll of the international 
documents addressing human trafficking in detail have essentially embodied a law 
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enforcement perspective”, and the Trafficking Protocol, too, is “simply one more component 
of the fight against organized crime.”83 This way of approaching the trafficking problem has 
recently become the object of severe criticism, however. Countless commentators have 
pointed out that the measures for punishing traffickers and tightening border controls have 
happened at the expense of the interests of victims. As Hannah Simon puts it: 
While the criminalization approach to trafficking is essential, it is not without limitations. By 
focusing on the criminal offence, anti-trafficking law becomes not only associated with, but 
sometimes also limited to, deterrence and punishment strategies.  In fact, by nature, the 
criminal justice system focuses on the prosecution of a perpetrator rather than on the needs of 
the victim.84 
It is not difficult, in general, to see a connection between the states’ measures against 
trafficking and the rise of the security discourse in the wake of the war on terrorism. As 
Elspeth Guild explains: 
after the attacks of 9 September 2001 in the USA and 11 March 2004 in Spain, the foreigner 
as a security threat has become part of the political and social debate on immigration and 
asylum. The security issue has been very much dominated by the need to control people and 
their movement.
85
 
The influence of the security discourse is, indeed, clearly visible in the approach that, for 
example, United States authorities have taken towards trafficking.  According to Arthur 
Richer and Sheri R. Glaser from the United States Department of Justice, “human trafficking 
rots the fabric of [the U.S.] society and, as a result, has a destructive effect on the United 
States' national security.”86 They explain that trafficking gives birth to corrupt governments 
that “have enormous potential to affect the national security of the United States on a 
military level”,87 “can affect the economy of the United States on a national security level”,88 
and “can also cause diplomatic burdens ultimately affecting national security.”89 
Furthermore, according to Richer and Glaser, “[a]nytime there is a motive to illegally 
penetrate the borders of a country, national security questions are raised”: trafficking can 
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provide not only criminals but also terrorists and spies an access to the U.S. territory.90 
Finally, trafficking serves to finance terrorists, breed more crime,91 and spread AIDS.92 
It is, thus, believed by many commentators that states do not fight trafficking out of sincere 
will to help the victims, but that at least part of the enthusiasm is due to the fact that “the 
border control emphasis inherent in the Trafficking Protocol and its companion Smuggling 
Protocol93 has provided states with a reason […] for the intensification of broadly based 
efforts to prevent the arrival or entry of unauthorized noncitizens.”94 It is not, indeed, 
difficult to believe, as James Hathaway does, that the anti-trafficking measures may have 
“created a legal slippery slope” in which states have found a way to criminalize not only 
trafficking but also smuggling in general.95  Smuggling and trafficking are clearly 
distinguished in the context of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
Unlike smuggling, trafficking relates not only to the crossing of a border but also to the 
treatment of the transported person, consisting of three elements: the act (the recruitment, 
transfer and receipt of the person), the means (threat or use of force etc.) and the purpose 
(some form of exploitation).96  Furthermore, smuggling is generally considered to be a 
voluntary arrangement between the smuggled person and the smuggler, whereas trafficking 
always includes an element of coercion. These kinds of clear cases are very difficult to find 
in real life, however, with smuggling often including elements of violence, coercion and 
exploitation, and trafficking being in many cases ignited by the eventual victims’ will to 
migrate.97 It is, therefore, possible to conclude that the quite artificial distinction between 
smuggling and trafficking gives authorities quite a wide margin of discretion with the result 
that “authorities are more likely to identify irregular migrants as smuggled rather than as 
trafficked”,98 as Simon puts it — meaning that the victims are deported instead of being 
given an access to the victims protection and assistance provided for victims of trafficking.   
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The connection between the criminal law approach and the security discourse is not the only 
thing bothering scholars and activist in the states’ measures against trafficking, however. 
Another source of protest is the fact that THB is increasingly considered to constitute more 
than a simple crime. The Finnish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, for 
example, begins her first report on trafficking by stating that, “[t]rafficking in human beings 
and related exploitation are considered one of the greatest human rights challenges of our 
time.”99 This notion of trafficking as first and foremost a human rights violation, combined 
with the aforementioned worry that, in concentrating on public interests, criminal law pushes 
the victim away from the center of the process and may even confuse him or her as a 
participant in a criminal activity, has lead countless publicists to demand the replacement of 
the criminal law approach with a human rights approach that takes the victim’s rights and 
needs as its starting point. ”[A] human rights approach”, proclaims Federico Lenzerini, for 
example, “is endorsed by those who see the need of restoring the human dignity of victims 
as the main goal to be pursed [sic] in the context of the fight against trafficking in human 
beings.”100 Elizabeth Bruch agrees, emphasizing that “[p]erhaps the most significant 
advantage that a human rights approach offers [for the fight against THB] is the ability to 
hold states accountable for how they treat both their nationals and other individuals under 
their control.”101 
The human rights discourse has entered the trafficking discourse with trumpets blazing and 
has already achieved some significant victories, forcing states to change their anti-trafficking 
measures into a more effective and humane direction. Progress is perhaps most visible in the 
context of the Council of Europe. In 2005 the Council finished the drafting process of its 
own treaty on trafficking, the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings (ECAT).102 The Convention, declaring in its preamble that “trafficking in 
human beings constitutes a violation of human rights and an offence to the dignity and the 
integrity of the human being […]”,103 has been widely celebrated as the first human rights 
document on the matter. Despite its regional status and fairly low number of ratifications, the 
Convention symbolizes an important step forward in the anti-trafficking campaign. 
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Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) gave tremendous support for the 
human rights approach when it found in its 2010 judgment Rantsev v. Cuprus and Russia104 
that both Cyprus and Russia had violated several of their obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)105 by failing to efficiently investigate the trafficking 
and eventual death of the daughter of the applicant.    
The human rights approach provides, then, a valuable and anticipated counterforce to the 
security paradigm that has so far been too powerful in the fight against trafficking.  What this 
human rights approach would include has, however, remained vague at best. As Tom 
Obokata, one of the champions of the human rights approach, admits, “the nature and the 
extent of obligations imposed upon States and non-State actors are not entirely clear, and a 
human rights discourse in relation to trafficking remains without much substance.”106 This is, 
perhaps, not very surprising, for it is, indeed, quite difficult to picture an efficient human 
rights solution to trafficking from a black-letter positivist perspective. Despite the fact that 
trafficking certainly has important human rights dimensions, it seems like a pretty 
straightforward criminal matter from a purely legal point of view, being a crime committed 
(usually) by an individual, or a group of individuals, against another, and therefore (often) 
lacking the vertical element that has traditionally been thought to constitute an important part 
of a human rights violation. Since the horizontal effect of human rights is still not very well 
established, human rights sadly seem like quite an ineffective tool from the victim’s 
perspective — at least at first glance.    
It is, therefore, necessary to get a better grip of this human rights approach to trafficking in 
order to be able to draw any conclusions regarding the expansion of the human rights 
phenomenon in general. This will be my goal in the remainder of this Chapter. To achieve 
my aim, I must first understand, how the fight against trafficking was translated into human 
rights language and therefore came to be seen as a human rights issue. I have already given a 
partial answer to this question above: the human rights language provided scholars a chance 
to criticize the selfish actions of the states and to demand better protection of the victims. 
Academic protest does not, however, suffice alone to explain how the human rights approach 
has become such a force that it has succeeded in forcing states to change their policies 
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towards trafficking, as is evidenced, for example, in the adoption of the ECAT — it is clear 
that there have been other forces behind this success, as well. It is these forces that I shall 
concentrate my attention on next, before concluding the Chapter with an assessment of the 
human rights approach.   
2.3. Translating anti-trafficking into human rights language 
It would not be possible to study the translation of the human rights language without 
mentioning the work of Sally Engle Merry. Merry’s study on how human rights law is 
translated into local justice in the context of gender violence demonstrates that the 
translation is a complex process, where a key role is played by intermediaries that navigate 
between the global and the local. As Merry puts it, “[t]ranslators are people who can easily 
move between layers because they conceptualize the issue in more than one way.”107 They 
must, on the one hand, speak the international language of human rights that the international 
donors prefer, and on the other hand, be able to present their initiatives in cultural terms that 
will be acceptable locally. The translation process has, according to Merry, three dimensions. 
The first is framing. This means packaging and presenting ideas so that they generate shared 
beliefs and therefore seem appealing and motivating to various actors. As Merry explains, 
“[t]he frame is an interpretative package surrounding a core idea.”108 The second dimension 
is “adapting the appropriated program to the structural conditions in which it operates”,109 
and the third the redefinition of target population.110  
In the case of trafficking, there seem to be two (groups of) actors, in addition to the 
academia, that are especially important in this sense and that could therefore be called the 
translators of the trafficking paradigm. These are the women’s movement, and competing 
feminist groups, on the one hand, and (local and global) NGOs and activists, on the other. Of 
these, the feminists have operated mostly (although not exclusively) on the global, 
governmental level, trying to affect state policies and pushing for legislation — and have 
therefore earned the moniker “governance feminism” from Janet Halley —111 whereas the 
NGOs and activists, constituting a more heterogeneous group, have operated both from top 
down, in the form of campaigns launched by global NGOs, and from bottom up, with local 
activists linking up with NGOs in a strive for wider visibility.  Since these actors have had a 
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more direct impact in the actual policy-making, anti-trafficking measures, and legislative 
processes, I would claim that they have played at least an equally important role as the 
scholars in the translation process of trafficking. It is these actors, therefore, that I turn my 
attention to now. 
2.3.1The women’s movement and governance feminism 
Trafficking in human beings, understood commonly to consist mostly of sex trafficking and 
to constitute, thus, an extreme form of violence against women, has, for obvious reasons, 
always been an important topic for the women’s movement. The anti-trafficking campaign 
has, therefore, always been tightly connected to the dominant currents inside the more 
comprehensive network. It is, consequently, clear that the translation of the anti-trafficking 
discourse into human rights language, too, was at least partly dependent of the more general 
warming towards the human rights discourse inside the women’s movement.  The movement 
had for a long time kept its distance from the human rights phenomenon, concentrating 
instead on more practical matters, such as providing shelter for victims of domestic violence, 
lobbying for national legislation, and making the problems caused by discrimination and 
violence against women better known.112 But in the late 1980s it became quite clear that it 
had to change strategy. The human rights phenomenon had achieved such measures that, to 
maintain its appeal, the women’s movement had to learn to translate its claims into human 
rights language.113 It was claimed that states were responsible for violence against women by 
failing to exercise due diligence in the protection of women from private individuals and 
therefore violated their human rights obligations. It was also stated that violence against 
women is a form of discrimination.114 Women’s rights and THB were merged into the human 
rights phenomenon at the latest in the 1993 Vienna World Conference.115 The Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action states that: 
                                                           
112
 Merry 2006 at 40. 
113
 Halme-Tuomisaari 2010 at 58-59. See also Merry 2006 at 21-24. 
114
 Merry 2006 at 22. 
115
 Roth, Venla, Defining Human Trafficking, Identifying Its Victims: A Study on the Impact and Future 
Challenges of the International, European and Finnish Legal Responses to Prostitution-related Trafficking in 
Human Beings, UNIPRINT, Turku 2010 (hereinafter Roth 2010a) at 51; Merry 2006 at 22-23; Chew, Lin, 
Reflection by an Anti-Trafficking Activist, in Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on 
Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights (Kempadoo, Sanghera and Pattanaik eds.), Paradigm Publishers, 
Boulder, London, 2005, 65-80 at 70; Bruch 2004 at 12. Before the Vienna Conference, THB was prohibited 
already in Art. 6, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (opened for 
signature 1 March 1980, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13, Finnish Treaty Series 67-
68/1986See also Reanda 1991 at 217-219. 
21 
 
Gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those 
resulting from cultural prejudice and international trafficking are incompatible with the dignity 
and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated […]116 
Soon it was reaffirmed, in the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, that THB 
constitutes violence against women and a strategic objective to eliminate THB was set.117 As 
Merry concludes, “by declaring the rights of women and girl children to protection from 
violence as a universal human right, the conference reasserted [the] dramatic expansion of 
human rights.”118 
The adaptation of the rights language and the increasing popularity of the anti-trafficking 
campaign also allowed the women’s movements to gain a stronger position in international 
politics. As the Cold War came to an end, the forms of power started to change. The 
fragmented, mobile, regulatory ‘new governance’ favored non-state actors and allowed 
feminists to take part in decision-making. Sex-trafficking became an especially important 
topic for feminists. Chantal Thomas bases this on three grounds. First, there existed 
conventions and principles, such as the 1949 Convention, that provided fuel and credibility 
for activism. Secondly, the Working Group on Slavery and the enthusiasm of the Clinton 
administration to fight organized crime provided feminists a role in global governance 
through THB. And finally, the willingness of several actors to combat THB, and organized 
crime in general, allowed the feminists to link up and network with other actors and 
therefore increase their power and effectiveness.119   
Because of the resources, contacts and possibilities the fight against THB provided, it soon 
became the battlefield of different feminist ideologies, especially relating to prostitution. 
Regarding sex work, there are roughly120 two competing views inside the feminist 
movement. In this study, I shall call them the structuralist and individualist approaches, 
although other terms have also appeared in the academic literature. 121 
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The structuralist feminist view is based on the radical feminist approach, created by 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin and Kathleen Barry. Following radical feminism, 
the structuralists claim that all prostitution should be criminalized, for it is impossible to 
completely voluntarily engage in prostitution, since sexual domination is structural. 
Prostitution in all its forms therefore oppresses women, and is comparable to slavery 
(consenting to which is not possible). Applied to THB, this means that transporting a woman 
into prostitution always constitutes trafficking, irrespective of whether this happened with 
the woman’s consent or not.122 
Individualist feminists, on the contrary, emphasize the importance of free consent. Even with 
the danger of oversimplification: one cannot be trafficked if one is not transported without 
one’s will. The same goes for prostitution. As long as prostitution does not occur in a 
coercive environment, it must be allowed. Criminalization actually justifies harassment of 
prostitutes and increases rapes. According to the individual feminists, the discussion on 
prostitution, as well as the fight against trafficking, should concentrate on the individual and 
her rights. It is, therefore, no wonder that the human rights approach to trafficking is 
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emphasized among the individualist feminists and that many human rights NGOs play a key 
role inside the movement.123  
The conflict between these two feminist groups intensified as the fight against THB started 
to gain a more central role in the official authorities’ war on organized crime. This war was 
one of the main priorities of the Clinton administration. Originally, it targeted money 
laundering and drug trafficking, but after Hillary Clinton attended the Beijing Women’s 
Conference and met representatives of feminist NGOs, THB became a third major concern. 
The liberal Clinton administration teamed up with like-minded feminists with the end-result 
that trafficking and prostitution were conceptualized distinct. To achieve this, the Clinton 
administration and the individualist feminists invoked the classical liberal concept of human 
rights that necessitated the idea of the right to choose and the need to balance competing 
rights in a liberal-legal frame.124 This approach met fierce resistance among the more radical 
structural feminists, of course. The separation of prostitution and trafficking, and the 
emphasis on the right to choose, threatened to water down the radical feminist project of 
making prostitution illegal. The Clinton administration was therefore accused of weakening 
international laws against THB.125 
It is at this moment that we see how THB started to play a key role in the power struggle, not 
only inside the feminist movement, but also in American and international politics, and how 
this connected to the human rights discourse in general. As the individualist feminists had 
allied with the Clinton administration, the structuralists also had to network to maintain their 
power, and indeed found support from conservative and religious organizations.126 This 
alliance between radical feminists and conservatives may sound surprising, but it illustrates 
extremely well the political value that the fight against THB possesses. While both feminists 
and religious organizations share the resistance against all kinds of sexual objectifying of 
women, including sex work, and the church has traditionally campaigned against all forms of 
slavery, it is clear that there are also more practical reasons behind this (un)holy alliance. As 
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already noted, the structuralist feminists understood that without help they would soon lose 
the internal feminist power struggle over prostitution. And the religious groups must have 
realized how powerful the image of an innocent girl chained to a brothel bed is, and how 
much positive publicity active campaigning against this atrocity would bring. Furthermore, 
more politically oriented conservative groups saw in the THB discussion a chance to score 
some political points against the Clinton administration.127 It is, perhaps, not that surprising, 
then, that similar alliances have occurred elsewhere, as well. Josephine Ho, for example, in 
an enlightening essay, shows how the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan seized the opportunity 
to prop up its position when it noticed the outrage caused by stories of young aboriginal girls 
sold into brothels. The Church quickly networked with such a wide array actors as labor 
issue-oriented progressives, human rights groups promoting universal human rights, 
women’s groups, various religious groups (of other denominations) and feminist NGOs.128   
It is also at this moment of mainstreaming of the anti-THB campaign and the escalation of 
the rupture inside the feminists that we see how the human rights language was, partly under 
compulsion, adopted to justify completely opposite political agendas. In light of how I have 
described the individualist and structuralist feminists, it would be easy to conclude that the 
individualist feminists acted as the advocates of the human rights approach and the 
structuralists adhered to a criminal law approach. But in fact both sides invoked the human 
rights language. The connection of the individualists to the liberal concept of human rights 
was already explained, and indeed the individualists and the Clinton administration found 
support from a branch of the UN human rights machinery, namely the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.129 But the language of abstract human rights supported 
also another interpretation of the subject, one that fitted the aims of the structuralists and the 
conservatives. The Kantian concept that man exists as an end and must never be treated as a 
means alone, allowed the translation of the oppressive and objectifying nature of prostitution 
to be translated into human rights language, and therefore human rights also justified the 
view that all transfer of women into prostitution constitutes human trafficking, irrespective 
of the woman’s consent,130 allowing the structuralists and conservatives to avoid the massive 
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legitimacy loss that they would have faced, should the individualists have seized the 
monopoly of human rights language in the struggle. This case seems to give a testimonial to 
the fact that Sally Engle Marry already discovered in her study on gender violence and 
human rights on the local level: “[h]uman rights are clearly an open resource, a source of 
political power available for mobilization by various groups in many different ways, but how 
they work depends on the context.”131 
The anti-trafficking campaign, therefore, soon became a platform for various political aims, 
interests and agendas. What started as a protest for the oppressed victims of trafficking was 
soon merged — in a story not that different from that of the 19th century England — with 
feminist power struggles, debates on prostitution, domestic and international politics and, 
through the religious groups, even with the anti-abortion132 campaign. All this was framed 
into abstract human rights language that could be invoked by both sides. And just like in the 
Victorian era, the faith of the campaign was soon snatched out of the hands of the activists 
that had launched the process. Although feminist gained more power and an active role in 
global governance by linking up with political actors, they also exposed their cause to the 
whims of power politics. The two important documents at the turn of the 21st century, the 
U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)133 and the Trafficking Protocol do not seem 
to be so much a result of a careful balancing of the needs of the victims of trafficking as 
manifestations of the prevailing American political atmosphere. 
The TVPA was a clear expression of the liberal view of the Clinton administration and 
contained a very narrow definition of trafficking. This approach also held fast in the drafting 
process of the Trafficking Protocol, although the structuralist NGOs were able to counter the 
influence of the liberal view much more effectively due to their leverage in the Working 
Group on Slavery and their experience with the UN framework, as well as the shifting 
political atmosphere in the U.S. The definition of trafficking was, therefore, much wider in 
the international sphere but perhaps still represented the liberal view. According to Article 
3(b) of the TP, consent of the victim is deemed irrelevant where any of the means found in 
the definition of trafficking (Article 3) have been used,134 which means, impliedly, that 
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consent is relevant when none of those measures is used, thus recognizing the possibility of 
choice in trafficking (and in prostitution).135 Things changed dramatically, however, as soon 
as Bush succeeded Clinton in the White House.136 Bush, influenced strongly by religious 
groups and committed personally to the anti-trafficking effort, adopted the abolitionist view 
and devoted great amounts of resources to the fight against THB. In his presidential directive 
on THB, Bush defined prostitution as “inherently harmful and dehumanizing.”137At latest at 
this point the feminists were deprived of their campaign, for the religious groups, that had 
originally assisted the structuralist feminists, overtook the place of the feminists in the 
administration.138 In 2007 the State Department’s website proclaimed that: “[n]o U.S. grant 
funds should be awarded to foreign non-governmental organizations that support legal state-
regulated prostitution.”139 It could be claimed, therefore, that just like in the 19th century 
England, the campaign was transformed into a social purity campaign as the Bush 
administration “committed to a far-reaching attack on commercial sex [targeting not only 
THB but also] prostitution, strip clubs, and pornography — all of which are associated with 
sex trafficking according to crusade leaders and government officials”, 140 These changes 
obviously had direct consequences also outside the U.S, as already witnessed in the case of 
the Trafficking Protocol (Hila Shamir, for example, shows that the Israeli governments 
approach to THB is directly correlative to the political atmosphere in the U.S.141). 
The women’s movement and the more modern feminists groups have played a vital role in 
the birth of the human rights approach, then. The adaptation of the human rights language 
among the women’s movement opened ground for the anti-trafficking campaign to follow, 
and the feminists, having become important players in global governance, have played a key 
role in indoctrinating the human rights approach into the consciousness of legislators and 
policy-makers, both on the international and on the national level. There are some dangers in 
this approach, too, however. Although I do not doubt that the primary aim of the feminists 
has always been to help the victims of trafficking, it seems that this wish has not been the 
sole motivation behind the adoption of the human rights language — the dominance of the 
rights language, and the legitimacy boost that they bring in power struggles also played a 
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vital part. There is nothing terrible about this, necessarily, if the end-result is the increased 
protection of the human rights of the victims. But the aura of legitimacy created by human 
rights also allowed measures that are against their function. As we have noticed, the 
bureaucratization of the anti-trafficking campaign also transformed the content of the 
campaign. It is not, perhaps, completely unreasonable to conclude that the campaign was 
‘hijacked’ by authorities in the sense that Douzinas lectures about regarding human rights in 
general: the feminists were so preoccupied with the conflict between abolitionist and pro-
work approaches to sex work and questions of governance that they missed the fact that 
serious human rights problems quietly slithered their way into the documents, with states 
being able to use their internal schisms to introduce tighter border control measures.142 
2.3.2 Human rights NGOs and local activist 
The other relevant actors in the process of translation of the anti-THB cause into human 
rights language are human rights NGOs that got interested in the cause, and local activists 
and movements fighting for the attention of funders. Both have been important actors in 
raising awareness of the trafficking problem, for well known international NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, with efficient marketing techniques, 
provide publicity for the cause, whereas local NGOs are often well connected and networked 
in the grass root level, operating daily with both trafficked persons and state authorities. 
In this context, too, we can see several, sometimes conflicting, interests guiding the 
translation process alongside the will to help the victims of trafficking. The set of NGOs is 
even more heterogeneous here than in the case of feminists, however, the field consisting of 
global human rights NGOs, funders, countless small NGOs helping trafficking victims 
locally, and everything in between. In this study, I must resort to a very crude generalization 
and concentrate my attention only on the simplest examples: the global human rights NGOs 
and the local activist groups. I shall start with the former. 
It is a common thought that NGOs make their decisions on a purely humanitarian basis and 
therefore concentrate their attention to the crises which cause most suffering. A considerable 
number of studies suggest that things are not quite this simple, however.143 While driven with 
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a sincere will to help, NGOs — being just organizations, although particularly noble ones, 
after all — must still base their decisions as much on strategic and structural as moral 
grounds in order to survive. In a world of scarce resources, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and other global NGOs have under compulsion become brands that must treat 
each other increasingly as competitors,144 which means that they must concentrate their 
resources to such conflicts and violations that provide profit — that is to say interest the 
audience and the associates, and seem cost-effective. Consequently, states, groups and 
movements with most publicity, resources, and contacts are most interesting for NGOs.145  
As Upendra Baxi explains:  
[B]oth the NGOs and funding agencies compete for scarce resources; this scramble for support 
generates forms of investor rationality, which may be generally defined as seeking a tangible 
return on investment.146  
In addition to scarce resources and each other, NGOs must also combat against compassion 
fatigue. To quote Baxi again: 
Human rights violations must be constantly commoditized to be combated […] Injustice and 
human violations is headline news only as the pornography of power, and its voyeuristic 
potential lies in the reiterative packaging of violations that titillate and scandalize, for the 
moment at least, the dilettante sensibilities of the globalizing classes.147 
If we forget, for a brief moment, all the humanitarian causes affecting the work of NGOs, 
imagine that there exists a human right markets where NGOs act (depending on the 
perspective) as buyers or producers and different human rights violations, problems and 
crises act as products, and look at things from a purely economical view, it is not difficult to 
see that trafficking in human beings is the luxury product — the Armani, Ferrari or Jimmy 
Choo — of this market. There is everything in human trafficking that NGOs could hope for: 
constantly increasing publicity, terrifying (and therefore interesting) stories, innocent, 
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beautiful victims, as well resources and contacts provided by different kinds of campaigns 
and state interests. It is, therefore, clear that trafficking is a very tempting object of 
investment, both from a humanitarian and an economical point of view. But crucial here is 
that, in order to become an acceptable target of a campaign, trafficking must be pictured as a 
human rights issue, for it is vital that organizations, including human rights NGOs, are seen 
to achieve the function that they were founded for — that they fulfill their raison d’être.148 
The function of human rights NGOs being the campaigning for human rights, it is necessary 
for them to translate trafficking into human rights language. 
A similar logic affects the local NGOs and activists, too. In many states, it is NGOs that 
have taken up the task of assisting the victims of trafficking, providing “social and 
psychological assistance, shelter provision, […] return and reintegration assistance […and] 
legal advice[…]”149 NGOs are, indeed, often better placed to help the victims than official 
authorities, since many victims, immigrating illegally, or having had their documentation 
removed by traffickers, hesitate to contact authorities. The NGOs also provide a more gender 
neutral environment for the victims in many states.150 All the tremendously important work 
of NGOs require a lot of resources, however, meaning that NGOs often have “limited 
capacity to provide all the basic needs of […] trafficked survivors”,151 as put by Marina 
Tzvetkova.  The NGOs must, therefore, “work in co-operation with other professionals and 
organisations.”152 Shelters for the victims, for example, ”are often funded by international 
agencies and administered by local NGOs.”153 It is, thus, of crucial importance that local 
actors can raise the attention of funders. To achieve this, they must modify their campaign so 
that it fits the goals and the image of the funding NGO: the aims of the campaign must be 
fitted into a globally accepted frame.154 Here human rights come to play a key role, once 
again. Since human rights provide the most universally accepted option, it is natural that 
grass root actors (and others) strive to translate their claims into human rights language. This 
trend is further strengthened by the fact that the most powerful so-called ”gatekeeper NGOs” 
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are currently human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch.155 
2.3.3 What can we learn from this? 
We can conclude, then, that the translation process is, in the case of trafficking, guided by 
several interests and necessities — as it always is. The will to help the victims of trafficking 
is certainly the most prevalent one in this respect, but there are also other reasons behind the 
translation process, ones that are required for structural reasons, in order to keep the various 
activist organizations and movements alive. Being able to put one’s claims into human rights 
language seems like a vital condition for many actors on the field. Nevertheless, this 
multicolored past of the human rights approach to trafficking seems to explain why it has 
remained quite vague and unfocused so far. 
Not too much should be read into this, however. For those working daily with trafficked 
women, it must seem self-evident that trafficking constitutes a grave human rights violation. 
I am not suggesting, therefore, that these activists working daily to make the world a better 
place would see the victims — or human rights, for that matter — as merchandise, but it is 
clear that some economic calculations and structural biases must play a role in the 
background, at least subconsciously. There is nothing scandalous in this, of course, nor does 
it seem like a particularly terrible thing — the end-result is the promotion of the rights of the 
victims, after all, and the protection of victims should be the primary objective in fighting 
any crime. There could lie some unintended dangers in this approach, however, considering 
the open nature of human rights and their capacity to be invoked for various causes. It is 
always necessary to reflect critically one’s own actions and motivations before suggesting 
human rights as a catch-all-solution. As David Kennedy writes: 
The vague and conflicting norms, their uncertain status, the broad justifications and 
excuses, the lack of enforcement, the attention to problems which are peripheral to a 
broadly conceived program of social justice — all these may, in some contexts, place 
the human rights movement in the uncomfortable position of legitimating more 
injustice than it eliminates.156 
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This is particularly a problem when the human rights discourse merges with foreign policy 
processes,157 such as in the case of THB, where THB became a central political goal (and 
tool) of both the Clinton and Bush administrations. As cynical as it may sound, the presence 
of the human rights movement may indeed make global governance blind to the bad 
consequences of its actions “by strengthening the habit of understanding of international 
governance in legal terms rather than political terms [and weakening] its ability to perform 
what we understand domestically to be these political functions”, 158 as Kennedy suggests. 
Procedures to enforce human rights may become rituals that direct attention away from the 
actual targets of the whole campaign, the victims of THB, and their problems, and other 
interests, such as political aims or the desire to build the anti-THB (or anti-prostitution) 
movement may take their place.159 “[Human r]ights language”, Merry explains, is [usually] 
adopted because it offers political possibilities to activists [and political actors].”160 In the 
translation process, international, often elitist, perspectives are translated down more than 
grass root aims are translated up. There is, therefore, a great danger that the needs of the 
victims of THB are set aside and are never transformed, just like the battered or 
discriminated women’s own experiences were alienated in the cases that Merry herself 
studied.161 For example Merry’s research on Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong 
demonstrates that the movement’s activism “depended on a complex layering of distinct 
groups with quite divergent ideologies.”162 Although the village women campaigned on 
behalf of their human right to equal inheritance, they were not very committed to this matter, 
but rather protested against much more specific injustices. According to Merry, it was local 
women’s groups that translated the grievances into human rights language so that 
transnational elites in Hong Kong, interested in human rights, could hear their protest: it was 
not necessary, in other words, for the rural women to have a deep commitment to human 
rights.163 
I must therefore conclude my general excursion into the human rights approach by returning 
to the level of academic publications and assessing legally and critically the arguments 
asserted in the name of the human rights approach. How are the various interests and 
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incentives behind the translation process crystallized into actual legal and policy claims, and 
how capable are these actually alleviating the plight of the victims? 
2.4 Assessing the human rights approach to trafficking 
After a study of academic texts advocating the human rights approach to THB, it is possible 
to identify at least four — or maybe I should say three and a half — claims made in the name 
of the human rights approach. First, it has been demanded that traffickers should be made 
responsible of their violations under human rights law.164 Second, it has been claimed that 
states drive the victims of THB in the hands of the traffickers by violating their obligations 
following from economic cultural, social and cultural rights.165 Third, it has been argued that 
the treatment of the victims of trafficking on behalf of the governments constitutes a human 
rights violation.166 The final factor was called only half a factor, for it is actually related to all 
of other dimensions of the human rights approach. This is the claim that the three other 
factors (or at least one of them, depending on the author), require a specific right to be free 
from trafficking to be effective. 
The sensibleness and assertiveness of these dimensions of human rights approach seem to 
vary. Let’s go through them one at a time. To recap, the first dimension is that THB violates 
the human rights of the victim. If we reflect on what elements this kind of crime consists of, 
it becomes clear that the crime of THB does indeed include several severe human rights 
violations. The freedom of the victims is restricted; they may be subjected to cruel or 
inhuman treatment, even torture, to coerce them to follow orders; victims are usually 
deprived of their property; transportation risks the health of the victims; even right to life 
may be threatened, for victims are often transported in overcrowded, dangerous ships and 
boats and, in some very extreme cases, disobedient individuals may even be murdered to 
frighten others. In their destination, the victims are often forced to work with minimal pay in 
horrible conditions, violating right to just and favorable conditions of work. It is not a 
surprise, then, that the ECtHR came in its case Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia to the 
conclusion that: 
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There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms 
of its victims and cannot be considered compatible with a democratic society and the values 
expounded in the Convention.167 
But, as we witnessed in the Introduction, almost any act or desires can be turned into a 
human right — or the violation thereof. Therefore, every crime consists of a human rights 
violation, at least in theory. Murder is a clear violation of the right to life, battery can be seen 
as inhuman treatment, or even torture, and theft violates the right to property and so on. 
Nevertheless, it would seem strange to treat these crimes in the court as human rights 
violations. The reason for this is clear: human rights are usually understood to operate in the 
relationship between individuals and the state. In human rights cases, the perpetrator is the 
state and the victim the individual. But in the above mentioned crimes, the perpetrators are 
the murderer, a frustrated gang of teenagers or a drunken husband and the pickpocket in need 
of some cash — in other words, another individual or a group of them. THB is not an 
exception in this matter.  Although trafficking can include bribed border guards, for 
example, it is in most parts an activity practices by private actors, be they individual 
criminals or larger criminal organizations. Someone forces or deceives the victim to join her 
and hands him/her to someone else to be transported, or transports him/her by herself into a 
new destination where (s)he is abused in some way, for example in a private business 
activity.  THB is, therefore, fundamentally a quite conventional — although particularly 
heinous and often transnational — crime.168  
This argumentation can be criticized of oversimplification at least on two grounds, however, 
as was hinted already in the (real) introduction of this Chapter.  First, one could point out 
that my view of a human rights violation as something between an individual and the state is 
outdated. As the court practice of the ECtHR shows, human rights do also possess a 
horizontal effect.169  Individuals must respect the human rights of each other. But as true as 
this may be — as witnessed already in the critique presented in the last section towards the 
expansion of the human rights phenomenon — another human being cannot be sued in court 
for her human rights violation (except in very particular cases).170 The horizontal effect of 
human rights has admittedly been increasing its support, and it is therefore suggested by 
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some commentators that approaching the case with too much caution serves only to “justify 
lesser obligations [on] corporations” and other non-state actors,171 but the fact is, 
nevertheless, that such an effect is not well established legally, and does not, therefore, 
constitute a very effective tool for the victims or their representatives. The horizontal effect 
means, therefore, at best, that the state must protect the subjects of its jurisdiction from 
human rights violations.172  
This leads us to the second claim of oversimplification. Could it not be argued that THB is a 
human rights violation on the basis that the state has allowed such a terrible crime to occur? 
As stated, a state does indeed have a certain responsibility, deriving from its international 
obligations, to protect those under its jurisdiction, 173 and according to the preamble of the 
ECAT, trafficking constitutes a violation of the human rights of the victim. Furthermore, the 
ECtHR has in its case Siliadin v. France explicitly stated that states have a positive 
obligation to combat slavery and forced labor,174 and it was reaffirmed in the case Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia that this obligation includes fighting trafficking.175 But — as regrettable 
as it may be — it cannot be realistically expected that the positive obligation could mean that 
a state must be able to prevent all crimes under its jurisdiction. States usually fulfill their 
responsibility to protect with legislation that criminalizes certain acts and adequately protects 
victims of crime. It cannot, therefore, be held responsible for a crime solely on the basis that 
an individual under its jurisdiction has been trafficked. The responsibility would require a 
significant negligence of the state’s responsibilities.176 This is reflected also in Rantsev, 
where the Court could find Cyprus and Russia violating their obligation under the 
Convention only on the basis of failing to effectively inspect the death of the daughter of the 
applicant (and for unlawful and arbitrary detention, in the case of Cyprus), not on the basis 
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of failing to take the necessary steps to combat trafficking or protect the life of the victim.177 
The Court explicitly stated, in fact, that:  
In order for a positive obligation to take operational measures to arise in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it must be demonstrated that the State authorities were aware, or ought to have 
been aware, of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual 
had been, or was at real and immediate risk of being, trafficked […]178 
This was followed with the reminder that: 
Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the obligation to take 
operational measures must […] be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible 
or disproportionate burden on the authorities […]179 
It would, therefore, seem that the appeal of this first dimension of the human rights approach 
depends on one’s perspective. The dimension certainly has merit from a more general 
perspective. It could be important for the victim to know that his/her suffering constitutes a 
human rights violation and this might also bring more compassion for the victims. Sadly, 
this does not seem to offer much relief for the victim from a strictly legal perspective, 
however. Since human rights do not usually have a horizontal effect (in practice), the fact is 
that whether the human rights of the victim have been violated, or not, matters only in some 
very exceptional cases (although it is good to know that there is such a backup if states act in 
a clearly negligent way).  
The situation is quite similar regarding the second dimension of the human rights approach. 
This is the claim that states — and not least those rich Western states most enthusiastically 
fighting against THB — have enabled the abuse of the (soon to be) victims of THB, and 
therefore the whole phenomenon, by failing to oblige with their obligations to provide 
adequate standard of living, education, opportunities, health care, protection from 
discrimination and violence, and so on, to individuals, and have therefore driven the least 
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well-off into a situation where they are easy targets for exploitation, including THB.180 
Accordingly, there is, as Alice Edwards writes, 
a strong need for human rights discourse around human trafficking to be broadened to 
consistently acknowledge and address root causes, and not only victim’s rights. Trafficking 
occurs along a continuum from the country of origin through to the country of origin, transit, 
and destination. Human rights treaties on economic, social and cultural rights have a key role 
to play in this regard.181 
This is also often framed as a human security approach to THB. As Mohamed Y. Mattar 
explains,  
[a]pplying the extended concept of human security means that it is necessary to address not 
only the right of the trafficked person to personal safety, but the other aspects of human 
security as well, including economic security, political security, legal security, and community 
or cultural security.182 
This argument is excellent and cuts deep into the hearth of the whole problem. States have 
traditionally been unwilling to commit to even minimal redistribution of wealth and have, 
therefore, been incapable to combat the most fundamental reasons of THB. Something akin 
to the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum could indeed 
be the most elegant and efficient solution to the trafficking quagmire.183 But, taking into 
consideration that the negligence of the economic, social and cultural rights, and the question 
of redistribution of wealth have for a long time been the topics of a much wider discussion, it 
must be questioned whether the trafficking discourse is the best platform to approach these 
issues, although it is certainly important to make the connection between poverty and 
trafficking clear.  While fighting for the still groundlessly neglected economic, social and 
cultural rights is a tremendously important task, narrowing the discussion to THB does not 
seem to add anything to the paradigm, but risks leaving important factors out of the equation. 
Attempting to construct the much needed campaigns against poverty in order to stop 
trafficking would most likely mean feeding one’s fuel for the wrong fire (although if there 
was a chance that one would actually succeed in eradicating poverty through this channel,  
who would I be to criticize?). Besides, if we put the black-letter lawyer glasses back on, it 
seems impossible to successfully argue that a state could be made responsible of THB solely 
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on the grounds that it cannot provide its citizens (or the citizens of some other state) the 
standard of living demanded in a human rights treaty, even though I do not doubt that 
publicists such as Caraway are right, when they proclaim that, ”[i]f slavery stops being 
profitable, and women are empowered, educated, employed, and respected, the practice of 
human trafficking will be contained.”184 We have to remain realistic. As stated by Mattar 
himself (although I admit that I am taking the phrase quite out of the context): “In essence, 
human security can encompass almost anything related to people’s lives […]”185 The 
ineffectiveness of a state can indeed have affected the crime — and many other problems — 
but this does not mean that the state has involved into the crime or has consciously allowed it 
to occur.  
The last target of the human rights approach to THB is the unsatisfactory treatment of the 
victims of trafficking by state authorities, after the victims have ‘escaped’ from the hands of 
their abusers. Indeed, the stand of authorities towards victims, often seeing them as 
criminals, the deportations of victims and the difficulties in courts have been widely reported 
in academic literature.186 ”[I]t is not unusual”, according to Joan Fitzpatrick, for example, 
“for foreign women and children who have been trafficked to be arrested, detained in 
immigration or criminal facilities, punished for engaging in prostitution or violations of 
immigration laws and deported […]”187 It is here, then, that we come to the most relevant 
dimension from the strictly legal perspective.  In mistreating the victims of trafficking, the 
state directly violates the rights of an individual as well as its responsibility to protect, 
constituting a human rights violation in its most traditional sense. This kind of treatment also 
usually follows from inadequate legislation on the matter, or from the unwillingness to apply 
the provisions, unlocking, therefore, all the tools that were out of the reach of the ECtHR in 
Rantsev. It is here at latest, then, that the human rights approach has finally won me on its 
side, if I was still a little hesitant before.  
What it all comes down to, however — and this is relevant regarding all of the dimensions of 
the human rights approach, not just this third one — is the question, whether the campaign 
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for the rights of the victims should be carried out within the existing human rights and 
criminal law frameworks, or whether the victims of trafficking require their own human 
rights, the right to be free from trafficking, or something similar. Roza Pati concludes, after 
listing all the human rights that the act of trafficking could possibly violate, that: 
If these provisions can be legitimately called rights and a part of the human rights universe, 
then it is scarcely comprehensible why the more fundamental right underlying all human 
trafficking instruments, the right to be free from being trafficked, can only be part of the 
criminal law. Both with respect to structure and content, this right is no different than the right 
to be free from torture or the right to life.188 
She continues that: 
Consequently, human trafficking deserves precedence under the hierarchy of evils that 
overpower the social fabric of our everyday lives. The plague of its casualties is unspeakable 
and is immeasurably aggravated by the element of transnationality and by the specific 
characteristics of many of its forms.189 
But is it really necessary to have a specific right against trafficking to fight for the rights of 
the victims? What bothers me in this is the despair of the advocates of this approach to prove 
that the victims of THB do indeed have human rights. But this should be a given, something 
that should go without saying — and there are indeed multiple human rights that already fit 
the situation, as was proved in Rantsev. If we believe that there exists such a thing as human 
rights out there, then the victims of THB have human rights simply because they are people, 
not because they are victims of THB. It is my fear, then, that it is here — as admirable, pure 
and innocent as the aim might be — that the whole movement could make an honest 
mistake, one that could trigger many of the backlashes that David Kennedy warned us of, 
regarding human rights and humanitarianism in general. It is also in this kind of situation 
that the potential problems relating to the expansion of the human rights phenomenon could 
possibly be activated, the specialized right requiring more detailed legislation and the 
application of expert knowledge. 
The specification of human rights law regarding a specific topic could also cause problems 
to other human rights campaigns. Signs of this have already been reported in the case of 
THB. James Hathaway lists three problems related to the attention given to the anti-THB 
campaign. First, concentrating on THB steers focus away from a larger human rights 
problem, namely slavery. Most of the modern day slaves are not victims of THB and are 
therefore left without protection. According to Hathaway, combating slavery would be too 
massive an economic sacrifice for many states, and the fight against THB provides them a 
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chance for an undeserved vindication. Secondly, the campaign also justifies the 
criminalization of smuggling. But since illegal crossings of borders will never stop in our 
unequal world, the criminalization of smuggling forces migrants to turn to professional 
criminal organizations, which raises prices and enables exploitation, such as THB. Finally, 
the fight against THB justifies hardened border control, which threatens the rights of 
refugees (for example).190 
Moreover, it must also be asked, whether it is rational to approach trafficking, and the rights 
of the victims, primarily through human rights instruments, or whether it should be 
approached as a criminal law matter, but simply with a better consideration of its human 
rights dimensions. Labeling an act or a treaty as a human rights treaty does not improve the 
situation of the victim in any significant way, if the criminal law treaty already contains 
provisions of a reflection period and other relevant safeguards, as is the case in most of these 
treaties. Actually, the ECAT, celebrated as the first human rights treaty on trafficking, does 
not seem to differ from the TP as much as one could assume. As Pati writes, “[i]ts provisions 
are similar in many respects to the Palermo Protocol [adopting] the same definition of 
trafficking as the Palermo Protocol and focus[ing] on prevention, protection, and 
prosecution.”191 It is certainly true that the Convention takes some very significant steps 
forward in comparison to the TP in replacing the vague, unbinding provisions on the 
repatriation of the victims, reflection periods and residence permits — consisting of such 
legal nightmares as “[e]ach State Party shall consider implementing”,192 “endeavour to 
provide”193 and “give appropriate consideration to”194 —195 with more binding provisions, 
such as a 30 days residence permit “when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person concerned is a victim.”196 But it must be asked whether this is because the ECAT is a 
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‘human rights document’ — a title that derives, to my understanding, from the facts that it is 
drafted within the Council of Europe framework and recognizes trafficking as a human 
rights violation in its preamble — or whether this is simply because the Convention was 
drafted five years later, in a regional setting, and within a much smaller and much more 
homogeneous group of states, than the TP (meaning that it is much easier to come into 
agreement on more binding terms).  
The steps taken in the ECAT, as important as they are, are also subject to some criticism, 
with Simon noting that the reflection period “is limited to a short period of time, and 
therefore, does not offer any guarantee that once it has expired the victim will not be 
returned to its country of origin”;197 and that lacking “national or even regional assessments 
regarding the appropriateness of return, repatriation procedures may leave space for forced 
return to a place which could present further risks of abuse, stigmatisation or 
retrafficking.”198 Furthermore, the right to remain in the country of destination is left “at the 
discretion of state parties “, instead of being “a decision based solely on whether the victim 
risks serious abuse in the prospective country of return”, meaning that “a protection gap 
exists in the anti-trafficking framework and needs to be filled.”199 
What matters with regard to both of these treaties, and treaties in general, then, is, in the end, 
the application of the treaty, and there is a great danger that a human rights treaty would be 
applied that differently from a criminal law treaty, taking into account the notorious 
indeterminacy and the already mentioned bureaucratization of human rights. More 
importantly, regulating trafficking through a detailed human rights treaty would be a step 
from the ‘core’ of human rights towards positivism and state sovereignty. It would mean 
abandoning the protest function of rights and activating the bureaucracy and administrative 
mechanisms of the state. No longer would it be possible to contest the inhuman treatment of 
the victims by invoking the most inalienable rights of every individual, if the application of 
the (criminal law) documents fails — that is to say to contest the treatment simply because it 
is clearly wrong and unjust — but one would have to invoke specific provisions of a specific 
treaty, and to the incalculable exceptions thereof, the interpretation of which would be solely 
in the hands of the (expert) judges and other (expert) authorities. We could therefore end up 
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in the same situation in which we are now with criminal law provisions and various 
regulations, but without the moral and ‘universal’ protest of human rights to back us up.  
An ideal situation from a human rights perspective would be one where the concept of 
trafficking would be required only for criminal proceedings against traffickers and the right 
to remain and the possibility for assistance would be provided for all immigrants (if this is 
what they want). Since it is unrealistic to assume that this would happen anytime soon, 
however, we are forced to choose between inadequate solutions. In this situation, I am not 
too optimistic of an approach that would utilize human rights for very detailed legislation. 
While I completely agree with human rights activists in that the importance protection of the 
victims of trafficking greatly outweighs that of the prosecution of traffickers, and share with 
critics the worry of the utilization of the trafficking discourse as a way of tightening borders 
and other security measures, I might prefer approaching trafficking through criminal law 
instruments — although ones that give adequate protection for the victims — and reserve 
human rights for the interpretation of this legislation and for a tool of protest in case that the 
application of this legislation leads to negative results — that is in case that we take a truly 
radical reform in favor of the human rights of immigrants out of the equation, of course. In 
my interview with her, the Finnish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Venla Roth, told that she understands the human rights approach as a method through which 
authorities (and others, such as the scholars criticizing these authorities) could assess their 
cases. It is my opinion that this seems like a very reasonable way of approaching the present 
situation.  
We cannot draw very far reaching conclusions simply on the basis of these very general and 
theoretical considerations, however. We must, therefore, study this last dimension of the 
human rights approach, the violation of the rights of the victims on behalf of the state (in the 
form of deportations and other such measures), that gained my trust in the human rights 
approach, in greater detail. In the next Chapter, we shall, then, descend from the level of 
theory to the level of practice, to the intricate web of practices and discourses that makes the 
situation of the victims of trafficking so complicated.  Can human rights provide help for the 
victims of trafficking, and if so, in what form? 
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3. Biopolitics of trafficking in Finland and elsewhere 
3.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, THB has become the target of global moral outrage, and states have shown 
great enthusiasm to combat this atrocity. Despite some problems, this combat, including the 
protection of victims, has found its way reasonably well into international documents and 
national legislation. 200 In the (few) court cases where judgments of THB have been handed, 
the penalties have generally been quite severe.201 States therefore want to give a clear signal 
that they are seriously committed to the fight against trafficking.  
But the actual application of the impressive documents seems to be strikingly different than 
the grandiose campaigns and the spent resources would lead one to believe. Several 
problems have been discussed in academic literature. First of all, it is criticized that the acts 
of the authorities seem to concentrate primarily on preventing illegal border crossings, i.e. in 
smuggling. If the traffickers manage to cross the border legally, the trafficking crime will 
quite likely remain undetected. Authorities also often overlook the use of the state’s soil as a 
waypoint in trafficking.202  To exaggerate a little bit, the attitude seems to be that as long as 
illegal aliens do not stay in their area, everything is fine.  Secondly, it is pointed out that very 
few judgments have been handed over the crime of THB,203 while at the same time potential 
victims of THB are often deported as illegal aliens. All in all, the identification of victims 
seems to be the greatest challenge in the fight against THB.204 Even if the victims are 
identified, the rights granted to them in international documents are seldom realized in 
practice. Staying in country is often possible only if the victim testifies in court against the 
traffickers or is otherwise for use in the solving of the crime, and even then only 
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temporarily.205 It is also not uncommon that potential victims are closed to immigration 
facilities for indeterminate time or even prosecuted for status related offences such as illegal 
entry, illegal stay or illegal work.206 It has, then, been concluded by various authors, that the 
motivations of many states to fight trafficking are questionable at best. Anne Gallagher, for 
example, writes that “[s]ome states, aided and abetted by civil society groups, continue to 
manipulate the global momentum against trafficking to wage their own wars against 
perceived social harms such as prostitution and illegal migration.”207 I shall now look at 
these problems in more detail in the context of Finland. 
3.2 (Anti-)Trafficking in Finland 
It was for a long time believed by Finnish authorities — and seems to be believed by some 
still —that THB does not concern Finland.208 For example, in 2002, the Finnish National 
Bureau of Investigation estimated that all of the prostitutes that had arrived in Finland that 
year were fully aware of the nature, terms and conditions of their work, even if there was 
knowledge of means of pressure and coercion that the prostitutes were subjected to.209 This 
belief was shattered, however, at latest, when the Trafficking in Persons Report 2003 of the 
U.S. Foreign Ministry listed Finland among the states that did not meet the minimum 
requirements to combat THB. It was stated in the report — and every report since — that 
Finland functions both as a destination and as a transit country for trafficking. According to 
the Report 2010 of the Finnish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, 
trafficked persons are abused in Finland as prostitutes and as cheap (or free) labor, for 
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example in  construction, restaurant, cleaning and horticular sectors, as well as in berry-
picking.210  
Worried of its international reputation, Finland quickly took appropriate measure to combat 
THB, and amended its criminal law provisions. THB is now punishable under Section 25, 
Articles 3 (trafficking) and 3a (aggravated trafficking) of the Penal Code.211 The former 
provision on kidnapping was abolished and included in the definition of aggravated 
trafficking under Article 3a. Article 3, therefore, covers such acts that are included in the TP 
but not in Article 3a.  There is no mention about the consent of the victim, but this can be 
explained by the fact that the crime of THB is regarded to be so grave that it is impossible to 
validly consent to it.212  
Despite legislative amendments, other anti-trafficking measure and a positive change of 
attitude in Finland, the situation has not, unfortunately, improved significantly. As 
elsewhere, the greatest difficulty seems to be the identification of the victims of THB. The 
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has estimated that hundreds of victims of trafficking 
arrive yearly to Finland to be exploited here, or to be transferred to another country.213 Until 
2010, only a few dozen victims were identified and guided to the victim assistance system.214 
Even if it is possible that the statistics are exaggerated — reliable research on trafficking is 
notoriously difficult to achieve —215 it is clear that only a fraction of the victims are 
identified.  The reasons are also similar as elsewhere. The Finnish National Rapporteur lists 
the following factors: THB is a hidden crime; victims are afraid of revenge if they identify 
themselves to the authorities; victims are suspicious of authorities; victims are hard to find, 
for they are marginalized; and the threshold for seeking help is high because the victims do 
not know their rights or are ashamed to betray their family or ‘friends’ (that often act as the 
perpetrators).216  
It seems insufficient, however, to explain the low number of identified victims solely on 
these grounds, connected to the nature of the crime. As Venla Roth notes, the problems of 
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the authorities in identifying victims of THB is at least as important a factor.  Victims of 
trafficking are again and again identified as prostitutes, undocumented aliens or illegal 
workers, which means that their access to the rights granted to victims of THB in 
international and national documents is denied and they are removed from the country.217 
According to Roth “[t]he identification of [victims] is impeded, in particular, by the section 
of the Aliens Act under which an alien may be refused to enter the country if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that he or she may sell sexual services.”218 Between 1999 and 
2007, the Border Guard authorities refused the entry of more than 1730 persons under the 
provision.219 
The number of actual THB cases is also very low, even though the amount of cases that had 
elements of THB is much higher. Until now, only five cases have been heard in the Finnish 
courts as human trafficking. The first sentence for human trafficking in Finland was passed 
in July 2006.220 Members of an Estonian-Finnish criminal organization had procured 14 
women, and the Helsinki District Court came to the conclusion that one of these women was 
trafficked. It noted that the definition of trafficking was met since the defendants had 
deceived the woman into prostitution by promising her a job as a nanny. The criterion of a 
vulnerable state was fulfilled since the woman suffered from mental health problems, and 
she also met the dependent status for she had been threatened with violence, should she not 
manage to pay her debt to the defendants. The court came to the conclusion that these facts 
also fulfilled the criterion of aggravated trafficking. The other women, however, had 
engaged in prostitution voluntarily, according to the court — a fact from which it drew the 
conclusion that they had not been trafficked, but procured, despite the very suspicious 
conditions under which the women has worked (including threats of violence against the 
women and their families, restrictions on their movement and different debts). Nothing 
changed in this respect in the Court of Appeal.221 
In the second trafficking case (I am rejecting chronology for the sake of conceptual clarity, 
and address labor exploitation cases separately as cases four and five, despite the fact that the 
first of them was decided already in 2007),222 in summer 2008, a young Finnish girl was 
forced to sell sexual services to pay back a fabricated snitching debt. The defendants took 
control of the girl’s private property, emptied her bank account and made her take fast loans 
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that she was unable to pay back, rendering her to a state where she was unable to make 
independent decisions. She was also subjected to severe violence and threatened with death. 
The girl, the Court stated, therefore had no other choice but to submit to the demands of the 
defendants.  The offence met the criteria of taking control of the victim, as well as sexual 
abuse and demeaning circumstances.  
In the third trafficking case, 223 an Estonian woman had been brought to Finland to work as a 
prostitute. In court, the injured party and the defendants disagreed on whether the woman 
knew about this prior to traveling to Finland. In any case, after arriving in Finland, the 
woman no longer had the courage to refuse since she was afraid that she would be left alone, 
without money, and unable to speak Finnish. When the woman refused to continue in 
prostitution, the defendants persuaded her to change her mind by promising her a different 
job in Sweden, once she had made them enough money. The District Court found the 
defendants guilty of procuring, but not of trafficking the woman. The Court of Appeal, 
however, considered the woman to have been, due to her indebtedness, life situation, and 
psychological properties, so helpless that she could not really make individual decisions, but 
had to submit to the will of the defendants. The Court of Appeal found, therefore, the 
defendants guilty of trafficking the woman.224 
The fourth and fifth trafficking cases differed from the other three in the sense that they did 
not concern trafficking for prostitution, but for labor exploitation. In the fourth case,225 two 
Finnish citizens with an Indian background had — for a high price — arranged the arrival of 
an Indian man to Finland to use him as free labor force. The defendants had confiscated the 
injured party’s passport, tried to arrange him into marriage with a Finnish woman and 
threatened him with violence. It was considered by the pre-trial investigation authorities that 
these acts fulfilled the requirements of human trafficking, although the authorities paid a lot 
of attention to the question of prior knowledge of the injured party of his wages, the nature 
of his work and to the role he had played regarding the arrangements. 
Things changed in the District Court, however. Both the injured party and the witnesses 
considerably toned down their accusations — apparently as a consequence of a settlement 
between the parents of the parties in India. In this situation, human trafficking was no longer 
an option for the court. One of the defendants was found guilty of facilitation of illegal entry. 
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In the fifth case,226 a Vietnamese man was suspected of having trafficked his nephew to 
Finland, in order to exploit him as forced labor in his restaurant. The nephew had told that he 
had worked in the restaurant 12 hours a day, seven days a week for minimal payment. He 
had also claimed that the defendant had controlled his bank account, taken his passport, 
acted violently towards him and threatened his life. According to the prosecutor, the 
defendant had, by bringing his nephew to Finland, in order to exploit his vulnerable position, 
committed the crime of trafficking. The District Court found, however, that there was not 
enough evidence of such a crime, since the workmates of the nephew could not (or did not 
want to) confirm the accusations, and the case was overruled.  
These five cases will be studies in more detail later. It should already be noted here, 
however, that in all of these cases, the threshold to apply the provisions on trafficking was 
quite high. The second case, where it was found that THB had occurred, was quite clear and 
extreme, whereas the threshold seems to have been unreasonably high in the District Court 
in the third case, and in the first case only the woman with mental health problems was 
deemed to have been vulnerable and innocent enough to be trafficked. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision in the third case was a welcomed advancement in comparison to the 
District Court’s decision, but even there the grounds of the decision raise questions, for it 
seems that the court altered the decision solely on the ground that it found the procured girl 
to have been mentally challenged, making the decision bare some resemblance with the first 
case (although the court’s arguments had become much more advanced in the third case, 
suggesting that clear development had indeed occurred). It is impossible to say much about 
the fourth and fifth trafficking case, because of the dramatic change of tone of the applicant 
and the witnesses in the fourth case, and because of the unclear evidence in the fifth one. It 
should be noted, however, that these are the only case regarding trafficking to labor 
exploitation decided in the Finnish courts, even though it is commonly believed (at least in 
academic literature) that this practice is not that rare in Finland. Let’s take two examples of 
cases that could be seen to have crossed the threshold of THB. 
First, in a case of the Savonlinna District Court,227 in spring 2009, a Finnish couple with a 
Chinese background had for ten years used Chinese workers in terrible working conditions. 
The employees had worked for up to 24 hours at a time in a small room that contained a hot 
steam. They were controlled during their free time and were not allowed to interact with 
Finnish people or study Finnish. As the workers also had no access to their accounts, and 
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their work and residence permits were tied to the restaurant, they had no possibility to leave 
their jobs. Even though the case was examined as human trafficking in pre-trial 
investigations, the prosecutor decided to bring charges only of discrimination at work 
(tantamount to extortion).228 
In another case,229 a company in the horticular sector employed Thai work force in 
inadequate working conditions. The employees did not have written contracts and many of 
the employees were not even aware of the terms of their agreement with their employer. The 
Thais worked for 200-290 hours per month, mostly without days off and without extra pay 
for overtime. The employer had confiscated the bankcards and bank accounts of the 
employees in order to be able to draw out different maintenance expenses from their 
accounts. When some of the employees wished to return to Thailand, the employer 
announced that they would have to earn the money to flight tickets with work. Later the 
employer stopped some workers from traveling home, unless they signed a contract in which 
they agreed not to demand more than 200-250 euros from the employer. Some of the 
employees were forced to stay in Finland by referring to their or their families’ debts to the 
employer, without ever informing them how large a per cent they had paid of the debts. 
Some had also been threatened with prison, and others were afraid that their families would 
be in danger, should they defy the employer. The employees lived in a trailer and in a 
warehouse arranged by the employer, without any contact to the outside world. The case was 
investigated as trafficking, but the Labour court sentenced the employer to fines and 
compensation for labor discrimination and other labor related crimes.230 
It is not difficult to see that both of these cases include several elements of trafficking. That 
they were still decided as cases of labor exploitation, however, seems to imply that the 
difference between labor exploitation and trafficking remains quite unclear to Finnish 
authorities and provides further evidence of the fact that victims of trafficking remain often 
unidentified in Finland. 
Venla Roth has, in her dissertation, identified four factors that could explain the troubles of 
the Finnish authorities to identify the victims of THB and to treat them accordingly. The first 
two problems relate to the attitudes of the authorities. First, Roth notes that “the 
understanding that trafficking does not concern Finland — at least not as a destination 
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country — seems to be emerging again among the authorities.”231 The authorities are, 
therefore, unable, or unwilling, to detect trafficking. The second problem is specific to 
trafficking to prostitution. According to Roth, “women in prostitution have always been 
considered as threats to society.”232 The effects of this attitude could be seen to be reflected 
in the other common belief that all foreign prostitutes migrate voluntarily and 
opportunistically to Finland with a purpose to sell sex.233 An extensive amount of cases 
dealing with foreign prostitutes, examined by Roth, show that a lot of weight is put to the 
free consent of the prostitutes. It is often emphasized that the prostitutes were aware of the 
nature and conditions of their work in Finland and had consented to the rules set by the 
procurers (traffickers).234 This leads into applying the anti-pandering law provisions instead 
of the provisions concerning trafficking. The notion is clearly problematic. Even if one had 
traveled to Finland in order to sell sex, this does not mean that one has consented to be 
controlled and mistreated, nor does it mean that one could not change his/her mind later. 
According to Government Bill HE 34/2004, pandering is transformed into THB, should the 
procurers use any methods described in the definition of THB to coerce the prostitutes to 
stay in business.235 As Roth notes, it is of extreme importance from the victim’s perspective 
that these provisions are then actually applied by the court instead of the provisions on 
procuring, for only as a victim of trafficking does the trafficked person acquire the victim 
status in the proceedings, and certain special rights, such as the reflection period and the 
victim assistance.236 
The remaining factors relate to Finnish legislation and especially to its application. The third 
factor is the complex and indeterminate relationship between the legal provisions concerning 
procuring, on the one hand, and trafficking, on the other. Both provisions become applicable 
if a person has been intimidated into prostitution. The preparatory works of the penal law 
provision on THB indicate that provisions are applicable even if no violent methods have 
been used. As was already explained, it is fundamental from the victim’s perspective that the 
provisions on THB are applied in this scenario. However, the Committee of Legal Affairs for 
the Parliament has stated that open concepts such as dependent status or insecure state 
should be interpreted narrowly and that the provisions on THB are to be applied only on the 
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most serious offences. The Committee has, therefore, set the boundary between THB and 
pandering in such a way that the THB provisions are only to be applied in rare and extreme 
situations, for example where a prostitute has been explicitly prevented from giving up 
prostitution.237 According to Roth, the courts “seem to refer to this statement whenever they 
seek to restrict the scope of application of the penal provisions on human trafficking.”238  
Similarly, even though the preparatory works infer that in cases where serious harm is 
caused to the victim, the THB provisions should be applied,239 the courts apply the fairly 
similar pandering provisions.240 
The fourth factor is the narrow scope of the Alien Act regarding the right of the victims of 
trafficking to remain in Finland temporarily or permanently: the residence permit and the 
reflection period. It was discussed during the drafting process of the Act, whether the 
reflection period should also cover illegal immigration, but in fear of potential misuse the 
application was limited to THB. As Roth notes, because of this narrow scope of application, 
the implementation of the residence permit and the reflection period depend on whether 
authorities are able to identify victims of THB.241 Furthermore, to be granted the residence 
permit, the victim must co-operate with the authorities in the investigation of the crime, 
unless the victim is in a particularly vulnerable position.242  The reflection period is granted 
by the District police or the border control authorities. It may be suspended by the same 
authorities if the victim has voluntarily and on his/her own initiative re-established relations 
with the traffickers, or if (s)he is considered a danger to public order, security, health or 
international relations.243 The period and its suspension are not subject to appeal.244 This 
seems to leave quite a wide margin of reflection to the authorities, especially since there is 
insufficient information available on what kind of persons the reflection period is grantable 
to, or how the duration of the period should be determined.245 According to Roth, “there are 
[…] reasons to believe that reflection periods are not issued even if the issuing of such a 
period would be possible.”246 She continues that “a large number of potential victims 
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arguably remain in the ‘gray zone’ without being identified and referred to the system of 
victim assistance.”247 
The margin of discretion is also very wide regarding victim assistance. The system of victim 
assistance is administered by two refugee reception centers situated in Joutseno and Oulu. 
The decision to apply the provisions on assistance, and to stop applying them, is made by the 
director of the specific reception center.248 The directors are assisted by a multi-professional 
expert group. The final issue that should be mentioned is the already mentioned section of 
the Aliens Act, under which an alien may be refused to enter the country if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that he or she may sell sexual services.249 Again, the wording 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” seems to leave quite a lot to the discretion of the border 
authorities. 
We can conclude, then, that despite positive changes in the Finnish legislation (that now 
seems to be up to date, for most part), there are still countless small problems and seemingly 
insignificant practices that make the situation of the victims very difficult. But what could 
explain the incapability of Finland, and other states, to correct these small problems despite 
their clear commitments on the levels of policy and legislation? A conspiracy is not a very 
convincing argument. It is not very believable that some mysterious actor would order 
authorities to act against legislation or that police officials, border authorities, judges and 
other authorities would independently decide to mistreat the victims. It seems rather, that 
there exists a sincere will to fight trafficking and provide help for the victims of the crime, 
but that along the way something happens, without anyone noticing, that twists the outcome. 
It is my claim, then, that before we can understand the situation that the victims of 
trafficking continuously find themselves in, and therefore be able to answer assess the help 
that human rights can provide them, we need to examine Michel Foucault’s notions of power 
and governmentality, and most of all his theories250 on biopower and biopolitics.251 
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3.3 What is biopower and what does it have to do with victims of 
trafficking? 
Foucault developed his theory on biopolitics and biopower especially in his work The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction,252 and on his, now published, lecture series Society 
Must Be Defended253 in the Collège de France. To understand biopower, however, it is 
perhaps the easiest to begin with a more familiar form of power, the sovereign power. This 
sovereign power is most clearly depicted in a feudalist system where power was held by a 
king and lords who had pledged allegiance to the king. In this system, the sovereign was 
interested in his subordinates mainly as tax payers and military force, and did not have the 
possibility to control their lives in detail. Since control was ineffective and random, the 
sovereign had to base his power on fear and grandiose acts. Power was therefore put in 
practice in the form severe public punishments: horrible execution and torture shows 
represented the unlimited power of the sovereign and kept subordinates ‘obedient’.254 The 
sovereign had, therefore, the power to take the life of his subordinates, or to let them live. 
The sovereign could deprive the subordinates of everything they had: not only their lives, but 
also their property, work force and products. But everything it did not take, is let be. 255   
A new form of power started to slowly develop alongside sovereign power, however. 256 This 
form of power, emerging first as disciplinary power that concentrated in the shaping of 
individuals, and developing later into biopower, saw its subordinates as biological, living 
creatures. It concentrated on the detailed control of human life. The birth of biopower was 
enabled by the rapid growth of population from the 18th century onwards, the birth of 
capitalism, the increased productivity, and the advancements in biology and medicine. 
Especially these two latter achievements, combined with statistics, were crucial for 
biopolitics, for they allowed the manipulation of biological processes. 257 Although an 
individual life might still be random — human beings fall ill and die unexpectedly — the life 
of an entire population or species is now easily predictable. The average lifespan of a human 
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being, the most likely risks for health, birthrate etc. are pure statistics and biology, and easy 
to manipulate through medicine. Biopower, thus, focuses on human beings as a species or a 
population, and no longer on subordinates as individuals.    
If sovereign power takes life or lets live, biopower makes life live, or lets die: it fosters life 
or disallows it to the point of death.258 As Foucault himself puts it: 
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate 
dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over 
them would have to applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking care of life, more than 
the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body.259   
Biopower has become the dominant form of power from the 20th century onwards, at 
latest.260 It has not completely replaced other forms of power, such as sovereign power and 
disciplinary power, however, as Foucault is often misinterpreted, for these other forms of 
power still live alongside, or inside, biopower. Especially disciplinary power is an extremely 
important tool from a biopolitical perspective. Like sovereign power, disciplinary power 
focuses on the individual, but has a different aim. Where sovereign power punished to arouse 
fear, disciplinary power, born in the 19th century, uses punishments to shape individuals into 
functional parts of the society. The aim of disciplinary techniques is not, thus, punishment, 
as such, but the controlling and shaping of individuals in order to build a perfect machine. 
Disciplinary power and biopower are therefore very similar to each other, but disciplinary 
power focuses on individuals, whereas biopower centers its attention on the population as a 
whole. These forms of power are, thus, more complementary than alternative: they need each 
other in order to be perfect. Disciplinary power shapes individuals into functional parts of 
the society in different institutions, such as kindergartens, schools, prisons and the army, 
while biopower maintains and manipulates the thus formed machine or biomass at the 
national (or nowadays perhaps global261) level. 262    
Perhaps a movie example could be illuminating here.  Does not the Wachowski brothers’ 
movie The Matrix depict biopower in its extreme form? In the movie, humans have been 
enslaved into energy sources for highly sophisticated machines.  Humans ‘live’ plugged in 
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machines in massive biofields, where every bodily function, nourishment and reproduction 
of each individual is in the precise surveillance of a computer. Humans are not aware of the 
situation, however, for the computer controlling them has programmed the ‘Matrix’, where 
people ‘live’ their virtual lives without realizing that they are simply virtual figures in a 
complicated computer program. Humans are, therefore, under the strict surveillance that 
biopower is aiming for, and their productivity is at its peak. Futhermore, the identity of each 
individual is carefully shaped and their apparently free choices are predefined by the rules 
and structures of the program.  
What does all this have to do with the victims of trafficking, then? In order to be able to 
answer this question, we need to open Foucault’s theory a little bit more. Especially two 
matters require closer examination. First, we must better understand the protective 
mechanisms of the society: biopower can also take a violent and racist form in order to 
protect the population, which can help us explain the mistreatment of the victims of 
trafficking. Secondly, we must examine how biopower actually functions. Only then can we 
understand how the aforementioned protective mechanisms reject the victims, although 
authorities in all levels of administration think that they are protecting them.  
First the protective mechanisms, then. Although the primary objective of biopower is to 
foster life, this does not mean that a biopolitical society would not be violent.263 Violence has 
simply changed its form so that it is more difficult to observe. But how can a society 
fostering life justify violence? Foucault’s answer is racism.264 Racism must be understood in 
this context in a very wide meaning, however. In controlling the population and in 
maximizing its functionality, biopower must also carefully assess all the risks facing the 
society. When the biopolitical society detects a risk for the population, it tries its best to 
neutralize this risk factor. Since the health of the population is vital for its functionality, 
biopower pays special attention to genetic purity. A biopolitical society, therefore, 
necessarily becomes racist, although this racism is not necessarily related to race in such a 
sense as the word ‘racism’ is usually interpreted to mean: humans are classified into different 
groups and those groups that constitute a threat to the population as a whole must be 
eliminated. The exclusion of this part of the society makes the population genetically 
stronger. 265  
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Again, the elimination of an entire part of the population should not be taken too literally — 
although the holocaust266 is often claimed to have been the extreme biopolitical measure, and 
Foucault predicted that there would occur more genocides under biopower than under 
sovereign power —267 for biopolitical violence is often more discreet and difficult to detect. 
Risks that that do not threaten the genetics of the population can be shaped through 
disciplinary power into a functional parts of the society in different institutions, making these 
threats ‘disappear’ into the mass.268 If an individual is irreparable, (s)he is first tried to 
exclude from the society. Illegal immigrants can be deported, mentally disabled patients can 
be locked into asylums and different outcasts simply left outside all societal functions, as 
long as they do not endanger the mainstream population. 
Let’s return to the Matrix. Early in the movie, the protagonist of the story, Neo, played by 
Keanu Reeves, is addressed by his boss, in the large company that he is working in, for a 
lack of respect of authority, after he has been (once again) late from work. The boss gives 
him the classical boss-speak: 
You think that you are special. That rules somehow do not apply to you. But you are mistaken. 
This company is one of the top software companies in the world because every single 
employee understands that they are part of a whole. Thus, if an employee has a problem, the 
company has a problem. 
This short conversation (or rather a monologue), masked as a typical occasion in the work 
place (although one with a particularly strange atmosphere) summarizes brilliantly what 
biopower and disciplinary power are all about by revealing how Neo is forced to become an 
anonym part of the machine while still paying extremely strict attention to the functioning of 
this one piece. I take up this example here, however, since it also represents the first 
protective mechanism of the society: the conformation of the individual into the society 
through disciplinary power. At the end of the conversation the boss gives Neo a possibility 
to choose: either Neo starts to play by the rules or there is no need for him in the company 
anymore (i.e. he is excluded). 
Not long after this incident, Neo is captured and questioned by the ‘Agents’ that act as the 
guardians of the Matrix.  The Agents suspect that Neo might have been in connection with a 
dangerous rebel leader Morpheus, played by Laurence Fishburne. The Agents could kill 
Neo, but come to the conclusion that Neo is not great enough danger to Matrix that he is 
worth it (one is lead implicitly to believe that Neo is of more use as an energy source). Neo 
                                                           
266
 On Nazis, the Camp and biopolitics, see Agamben 1998 at 166-180 and Foucault 2003 at 259-260.  
267
 C. Taylor 2011 at 50. 
268
 See Hardt & Negri 2001 at 23. 
56 
 
has become classified as a risk, however, so he is assembled with a sort of tracer and 
therefore put under increased surveillance. Only later in the movie, when Neo becomes a real 
threat, despite his exclusion, by joining the resistance movement — symbolized of course, 
by unplugging Neo out of the machines controlling humans — does he become something 
that must be terminated (the most extreme protective mechanism of the ‘society’ is 
represented in the movie by squid-like elimination robots). 
If we return finally to the main topic, i.e. the victims of trafficking, it is not difficult to 
deduct that they constitute a risk to the society from a biopolitical perspective. Let’s pause 
for a second to think who the victims of trafficking are, actually. It is clear that a typical 
victim of trafficking is not rich and successful. The victims typically become trafficked 
because they have no protectors and no alternatives and have therefore ended up in the hands 
of traffickers through coercion or fraud. The victims are, therefore, often outcasts of the 
society — those that have already been excluded from their societies or families. Let’s return 
to the first moments of the anti-trafficking campaign in 19th century England. As we 
remember, trafficking became a topic of sensation when British women ended up in the 
hands of traffickers when authorities started to fight prostitution as a threat to the health of 
the population. Trafficking (of the British women) was enabled, therefore, by the exclusion 
of a whole part of the society after they had become profiled as a risk. These kinds of 
measures were not limited to Victorian England, of course. Toomas Kotkas, for example, has 
studied the anti-prostitution laws in Sweden-Finland expressly from the biopolitical 
perspective, and his description matches very well the story of England.269 It is clear, 
therefore, that biopower and prostitution, and consequently trafficking, have from the very 
beginning been tightly connected. The victims of trafficking form, then, a risk to the society, 
for biopolitical risk assessments profile them to be ‘inferior’ outcasts and possible criminals 
and disease carriers and therefore a threat to the welfare of the population.270 
This leads us to the second question under examination, the functioning of biopower. Now 
that we understand why the society mistreats the victims of trafficking, what can explain that 
this problem has been unsolvable? As already mentioned, I do not find believable that 
legislators, police officers, judges, and other authorities, would consciously discriminate 
against trafficking victims. It seems much more likely that they are sincerely willing to help 
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the victims but the outcome is twisted somewhere along the process without anyone 
noticing. To be able to comprehend this result, we must further explore Foucault’s notions of 
power and governmentality. According to Foucault: 
Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent 
in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process 
which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses 
them […] Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere […It] is simply the over-all effect that emerges from […] mobilities, the 
concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement […Power] 
is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.271 
Power is, therefore, not a personal skill or capacity of an individual, nor is it an institution or 
a structure. Power is rather a complicated ratio of different forces.272 Force means the 
possibility to carry out different tasks — labor force and coercive force are good examples 
— and power is therefore an attempt to manage and control these forces in order to achieve 
some aim.273 When this kind of situational power becomes settled, it transforms into planned, 
calculated governmentality.274 Kai Alhanen has substantially clarified this abstruse, even 
mystical, notion of power by interpreting Foucault’s analysis of power from the perspective 
of practices. 275 According to Alhanen, “the use of power transforms into governmentality 
when practices generate and maintain planned and long-span relations of power.”276 
Governmentality is, thus, possible because different practices constantly maintain and renew 
relations of power. For example, prisoners are constantly exposed (often without noticing) to 
the power of the prison guards, and this maintains power, and allows the result that a small 
group of prison guards are capable of governing a significantly larger number of prisoners.277   
When relations of power are, thus, transformed, through practices, into governmentality, 
they become relatively independent of the aims of the subjects partaking of the practices. 
Foucault came to the conclusion, therefore, that power, and especially governmentality, is 
fundamentally non-subjective. Governmentality certainly has its aims (as we have noticed in 
the case of biopower, for example), but it is not dependent on the will of its executor. 
Foucault explains that large strategies of power are “anonymous, almost unspoken strategies 
                                                           
271
 Foucault 1978 at 92-93. 
272
 Lynch, Richard A., Foucault’s theory of power, in Michel Foucault: Key Concepts (Dianna Taylor ed.), 
Acumen, Durham, 2011, 13-26 at 21. 
273
 Douzinas & Gearey 2005 at 59; Alhanen 2007 at 119-120. 
274
 Alhanen 2007 at 124. 
275
 Ibid. at 102-150. Different practices were a vital part of Foucault’s historical studies (See ibid. at 34-47). 
276
 Ibid. at 125. Translated by me from Finnish. The quote goes in original language as follows: ”vallankäyttö 
muuttuu hallinnaksi, kun käytännöt synnyttävät ja pitävät yllä suunnitelmallisia ja pitkäjännitteisiä 
valtasuhteita.” 
277
 Ibid. at 126-127. 
58 
 
which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose ‘inventors’ or decisionmakers are often 
without hypocrisy.”278 Richard A. Lynch illuminates this complex conclusion with an apt 
example. What kind of clothes a youngster wears in school tells a lot about that person and 
her status in school. How she dresses in the morning is, therefore, part of a complicated 
strategy or tactic, a very conscious and rational decision, and guided by power relations. 
Clothes act as part of power and governmentality, but the crucial notion is that no single 
student, group or supervisor can choose what is to be interpreted as ‘cool’ or ‘geeky’. That 
which is ‘in’ today can be ‘out’ tomorrow, which again affects the status of different groups 
of people. 279 
The contemporary society is based on governmentality. Through governmentality, the 
(bio)political power governs, arranges, maintains and controls the population and goods. 
Governmentality, therefore, enables biopolitics. States have become dependent on 
governance that is actualized through different practices and tactics, not through clear 
political decisions.280 Having realized this, we can finally comprehend the difficult situation 
of the victims of trafficking. Although authorities operating with trafficking victims on 
different levels of society aim to help the victims, this is often impossible in practice, since 
power is fundamentally non-subjective. An individual or even a group does not really have 
much power, but power is actualized through different practices aiming for governance. This 
governmentality executes biopolitical aims, and since the victims of trafficking constitute a 
risk to the society from the biopolitical perspective, different control mechanisms — the 
‘Agents’ of the real life — commanded by biopower try to exclude the victims from the 
society. 
This point is, once again, hammered home, although in a way too aggressive and harsh way, 
in the scene in The Matrix — beginning, of course, with people standing in red lights, 
although cars are nowhere to be seen — where Morpheus is trying to describe Neo, how the 
Matrix operates. Moprheus explains: 
The Matrix is a system, Neo. That system is our enemy. When you are inside [the Matrix] and 
look around, what do you see? Businessmen, teachers, lawyers, carpenters. The very people 
whose minds we are trying to save. But until we do, these people are still our enemies. You 
must understand that most of these people are not ready to be unplugged, and many of them 
are so hopelessly dependent on the system that they will fight to protect it. 
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The scene is ended with a woman, that Neo was eyeing during Moprheus’ monologue, 
suddenly transforming into an ‘Agent’ and pointing a gun at Neo. The point is made clear for 
even those that were not paying close attention to what Morpheus was saying: anyone can 
become an ‘Agent’, anytime, and without even realizing it. The effect is repeated throughout 
the movie, emphasizing that, in the ‘Matrix’, the ‘Agent’ is no-one and yet anyone.  
What we should take from this scene-put-out-of-proportion is not that everyone is an enemy, 
but that biopower operates non-subjectively through different practices and mechanisms, and 
therefore potentially through any person. This also reveals the weakness of laws, and 
therefore also the criminal law approach, from the victims perspective, in cases, such as 
trafficking, where the victims can be classified as risk factors to the society. As Judith Butler 
demonstrates, governmentality uses laws as part of its tactic. When the interpretation of laws 
becomes part of the bureaucratic machine and is put into the hands of different experts, clear 
rules are vanished and the discretion of the authorities is increased.281 Since the authorities 
are, despite their pure intentions, still guided by biopolitical practices and structural biases, 
the blurring of rules leads to the vanishing of the rights of the victims. The diminishing of 
the rule of law combines sovereignty with governmentality and opens them more space to 
operate. Laws are either narrowed in the name of the sovereign or used to control the 
population. And the stronger the sovereign grows, the weaker the laws become, and the more 
governance there is, for the ultimate goal of sovereignty is always to strengthen itself, and 
this is possible (in the contemporary society) only through biopolitics. As already stated, the 
replacement of sovereign power with biopower and governmentality does not mean the 
evanescence of sovereignty or the decline of the state. It is exactly the diminishing of the 
rule of law that enables the revival of sovereignty inside governmentality and thanks to it.282    
Could not human rights provide an answer, then? Is not the whole raison d’être of human 
rights, as universal and inalienable, to challenge sovereignty, to establish something that 
cannot be sacrificed for the ‘common good’? Before being able to answer this fundamental 
question of the Chapter — and indeed the whole thesis — at least in the specific case of the 
victims of trafficking, we must take one more detour, however, and descend once more to 
the level of practice. To understand the intricate relationship between human rights and 
biopower, we must reassess the practice of the anti-trafficking measures from a biopolitical 
perspective. 
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3.4 Reassessing the (Finnish) anti-trafficking measures from a Foucauldian 
perspective  
As noted above, non-subjective biopower operates through discourses and practices. Small, 
seemingly insignificant details accumulate and multiply, creating an impenetrable and 
inescapable whole, an unnoticeable machine. It is not difficult to detect these small details in 
the Finnish and international anti-THB legislation, in the application of these provisions and 
in the whole discussion on THB, if one knows what to search for — although it is near 
impossible to predict how each of these details links up with others and what kind of 
consequences this may have. 
It is perhaps the easiest to start from the two wide discourses, referred to already in Chapter 
2.2 that could be seen to present two opposing poles in the case of THB, in between which 
other discourses place. On the one hand we have the security discourse. In this paradigm, 
THB is seen as a security threat to the state and the individuals inhabiting it: the population. 
The organized, large-scale nature of trafficking is emphasized and the alleged security 
problems — the expansion of transnational and international criminal organizations, 
terrorism, illegal immigration, and spread of diseases —283 caused by THB are put in the 
center of the discourse, even if it is difficult to tell whether all of these heterogeneous 
elements are truly consequences of THB, or the other way around. The language invoked is 
that of panic. The security and health problems related to trafficking are emphasized and 
exaggerated and shocking expressions and phrases are utilized. 
None of this is to suggest a conspiracy theory, however. There is no one pulling the strings 
and plotting to let biopower operate. A journalist may use more dramatic expressions than 
need be to sell the newspaper; ministries and other governmental units may exaggerate a 
little bit to gain more funds, and to be sure not to make a mistake; a politician may fish for 
votes, perhaps; and there is certainly nothing surprising in people worrying for their jobs or 
the safety of their children. However, once these small elements start to combine and link up, 
the result can be quite immense.  
After THB has been profiled as a security risk, stricter and more comprehensive control 
mechanisms are needed to tackle this threat. The results are, then, often very harmful to the 
victims of THB, as was noted in sections 3.1-3.3, since from the viewpoint of security, 
trafficked women start to appear as illegal migrants, foreign prostitutes, disease carriers, or 
other dangerous subjects — in any case threats to the population. It is exactly these 
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governmental practices against which the language of human rights provides a valuable 
counter-force, advocated by NGOs, activists and academics. Human rights are needed to 
protect the victims and their human dignity from discrimination and inhuman treatment.   
On the other hand, then, we have the humanitarian discourse. In this discourse, attention is 
directed away from the security questions surrounding THB, and the true victims of 
trafficking — the persons actually trafficked — are put into the highlight. Instead of a 
language of risk and panic, a language of pity is invoked. To protect the rights of the victims 
against the effects of the security approach, the horrific experiences of the trafficked persons 
are emphasized. Every horrible detail of their suffering carefully described and the story re-
told and re-told again.  
But even with horrendous stories, those invoking the language of pity may meet obstacles. It 
is a well known fact, after all, that “[p]ity cannot work for those who are deemed responsible 
for the ills that have befallen them or those who are considered dangerous to the 
community.”284 Since many of the victims of THB have actually been willing to act as 
prostitutes, and are therefore often deemed ‘responsible’ or even considered ‘dangerous’, 
this may become problematic. Suffering may suffice to be redeeming or purifying, if it can 
be described intensively enough,285 but if this does not work, the humanitarians have two 
possibilities. Either they can further emphasize the innocence of the victims, in which case 
the most important task becomes “identifying trafficked women through dis-identifying them 
from [the dangers of THB]”286 and a victim discourse starts to develop under the 
humanitarian discourse; or they can ask for tolerance (falling back on pity), in which case the 
discourse start to bear resemblance to the toleration discourse studied by Wendy Brown.287  
In any case, we can see that new discourses start to emerge between the two poles.  
Closer to the security pole, special attention should be given to the discourse of war. 
Connecting war with trafficking may sound surprising at first, but once we start looking at 
the terminology used in the trafficking discourse, we can notice that it is permeated with the 
rhetoric of war. It is impossible to write more than few sentences on the topic of THB 
without resorting — consciously or subconsciously — to such terms as ‘fight against 
trafficking’ and ‘war on trafficking’, as is evidenced, for example, in this study. And, as soon 
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as we put more thought into it, we can understand that rather than being a surprising quirk, 
this intertwining of war and THB is actually a necessary phenomenon in the biopoliticized 
world.  As Foucault explains, we should, in the present condition, “invert Clausewitz’s 
proposition [that war is the continuation of war by other means] and say that politics is the 
continuation of war by other means.”288 Power relations in our societies are, according to 
Foucault, “anchored in a certain relationship of force”,289 meaning that political power is 
forced to perpetually use “a sort of silent war” to maintain its power.290 It is no wonder, then, 
that, as Hardt and Negri point out, “[w]ar is becoming a general phenomenon, global, and 
interminable.”291 Through war, relations of power and techniques of domination are revised 
and all aspects of social life produced and reproduced.292 It has therefore been transformed 
from a Schmittian limited state of exception into a permanent, general state — the rule, one 
could claim — blurring the distinction between war and politics, giving way to the security 
paradigm, and allowing biopower, operating through indeterminate governmental 
techniques, to bloom.293 
In service of biopower, aimed to make life live, and allowed to kill only to improve life, war 
has changed its essence. Only seldom does it take the traditional form of an armed conflict 
between two sovereigns. Instead, it has transformed into a civil war on a global terrain,294 
with abstract, rather than concrete enemies. War is now waged against poverty, or more 
concretely on drugs, crime and terrorism:295 it has been reduced to police action. War on 
THB is, then, a natural addition to this continuum, one that transcends social and political 
boundaries. Indeed, as Michael Grewcock has noted, the war against THB and smuggling is 
constantly used to legitimize and extend ‘Western exclusion zones’— areas of externalized 
border control.296 An especially important feature of the war discourse is that, although  more 
familiar to the supporters of the security approach, it is at least subconsciously adopted by 
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humanitarians and academics alike, permeating the whole discussion, and therefore blurring 
the distinction between governmental forces and humanitarians  and allowing the 
manipulation of the human rights rhetoric.297   
In the midst of these general discourses, things start to happen also on a more particular 
(regional, national or local) level. Beliefs, attitudes and smaller scale discourses start to 
appear. These may be given birth by the more general discourses, or they may be born out of 
specific or structural biases, concerns and interests. There is a countless amount of these 
kinds of local effects, but some mentioned already in this study could perhaps be used as 
examples. It was, for example, noted, referring to the study of Venla Roth, that there seems 
to be an understanding among Finnish authorities that THB does not concern Finland (at 
least not) as a destination country, which seems understandable, if the Finnish situation is 
mirrored on the extreme cases pictured by both the language of panic, given birth by the 
security paradigm, and the language of pity, advocated by the humanitarians. In addition to 
this, the belief that all foreign prostitutes migrate voluntarily to Finland, with the intention to 
sell sex, was mentioned. According to Roth, this belief can be connected to the liberal notion 
of free will, as well as the exceptionally strong position of women in Finland compared to 
many societies on the international level.298 The notion of independent women, responsible 
for themselves, prevalent in the Finnish society, may, then, sometimes paint an erroneous 
picture of the actions of the trafficked women, if authorities are not able to grasp the 
difference in their cultural background.   
To widen the scope outside Finland for a final example, there seems to be a common belief 
among authorities worldwide that “‘real’ victims of human trafficking”, as Dina Francesca 
Haynes notes, in the context of the United States, “will be found when they are liberated 
from their exploitation by law enforcement officials.”299 She continues by stating that, “the 
practice of the [U.S. authorities] demonstrates their belief that a victim of human trafficking 
is more legitimately a victim […] if she happens to be rescued by U.S. government 
officials”, and that “[s]ometimes victims not rescued by officials are even susceptible to 
being viewed as criminals […] worthy of deportation.”300 This de facto division between 
real, or good, and bad victims of THB links up with the stories heard of THB in the mass 
media: as already noted, it is often only the most horrendous stories that reach the media. In 
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the context of THB, this means that it is the stories about sex trafficking that gain attention, 
while stories about domestic servitude or labor exploitation do not.301 
Together, these different general and particular discourses, beliefs and stories discussed in 
this section combine to create a very powerful myth of trafficking. As Jo Doezema notes, the 
mythical victim of THB is a white, innocent woman, abused in prostitution in the hands of 
brutes.302 This picture consists of several parts. First, the victim is abducted or severely lured 
or deceived. By no means can the mythical victim of trafficking have been aware of ending 
up working in prostitution, even if she would have been unaware of the actual conditions of 
her work. As Sally Engle Merry explains: “Those who are selected [as victims] are typically 
those who are in some way helpless, powerless, unable to make choices for themselves”, 
whereas “[t]hose who choose to put themselves in a dangerous situation are less deserving of 
the status of victim […]”303 Secondly, to establish the innocence of the victim, her youth and 
virginity, or alternatively her beauty, are emphasized. Thirdly, repetition of horror stories of 
violence and abuse serve to reinforce the victimization of the trafficked women.  All of these 
factors distinguish the ’true victims’ from ‘guilty’ prostitutes.304 The whiteness of the victims 
is also emphasized, in stark contrast to the dark, terrifying ‘otherness’ of the mythical 
trafficker, who is usually pictured as a dark, eastern brute.305 One commentator even 
compares traffickers to the ‘Dementors’ from the Harry Potter saga: horror creatures that 
“glory in decay and despair [and] drain peace, hope, and happiness out of the air.., long 
enough to reduce you to something like itself... soulless and evil.”306     
This creation of stereotypes, of course, corresponds to the more general paternalistic 
symbolism criticized in international law.307 It is not uncommon, especially in the context of 
human rights, to picture the perpetrators as vicious savages, the victims as innocent, yet 
helpless creatures, and the saviors as the virtuous white knights who save the day. David 
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Kennedy warns us about the consequences of the use of these kinds of metaphors, writing 
that: 
Coming into awareness of oneself as the representative of something else — heroic agent for 
an authentic suffering elsewhere — mutes one’s capacity for empathy or solidarity with those 
cast as victims, violators, and bystanders, and stills the habit of understanding oneself to 
inhabit the world one seeks to affect.308 
More specifically in the context of THB, Fransesca Haynes regrets that: 
[b]y failing to understand enough about the people who are trafficked, and focusing media 
attention on the sex and victimization aspects of the crime, we risk “essentializing” and 
“othering” the victims. That is, we are reducing the victims, usually women from the southern 
or eastern hemispheres, to stereotypes based on race and gender, and those stereotypes are 
conflated with the sexualized nature of the crime. Then we are setting “them” at a distance 
from “us.”309    
It should be remembered, however, that a myth is not necessarily negative. As Jo Doezema 
explains, leaning on Laclau, a myth operates as “a model of how society should be” and as 
“a surface on which social demands are inscribed”.310 It can, therefore, “also encode hopes 
for emancipatory social change.” ‘White slavery’, for example, she explains, “was also used 
to point to injustices towards migrants, exploitative working conditions, and discrimination 
against women.” So too the myth of trafficking, then, “can express concerns about actually 
existing injustices.”311 
The myth is, then, not only a consequence of the panic language utilized by the security 
discourse, although this may be its loudest source. It is, in fact, almost as prevalent between 
the humanitarians. But though providing emancipatory potential, it may also turn out to be 
the humanitarians’ largest pitfall, for it is consequently through this myth that the seemingly 
opposite discourses of THB start to intertwine. Although the myth may have been created by 
the discourses surrounding THB, its relationship to these seems to be mutually reinforcing: 
the discourses feed the myth, but the myth simultaneously backs up arguments used in the 
THB discourse. And, importantly, the same myth is used to back completely differing views. 
For example, the repetition of the most extreme cases of trafficking serves to arouse fear, 
and therefore justify stricter border controls, just as well as it raises pity towards the victims 
of THB. Similarly, the myth of innocent, white, young victims does not only inspire people 
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to fight for the rights of trafficked persons, but also provides material for sensational 
newspaper articles concerning THB. 
Even the most opposing poles of the THB discourse are not, then, really contradictory. In 
fact, these poles are firmly connected through the other discourses that operate somewhere in 
the gray area between them. For example, the victim discourse that was presented earlier as 
some kind of by-product of the humanitarian discourse serves an important function in the 
security discourse as well. It is important for the security paradigm that it is seen to protect 
individuals from the danger of trafficking, even as it excludes threats from the society. The 
myth of innocent victims turns out, then, to be an important tool also for the security 
paradigm. When only a very small proportion of trafficked persons meet the criteria of the 
mythical victim, authorities easily concentrate all their efforts on these persons, and to 
expose them to increased surveillance and control, while excluding all the other, ‘guilty’, 
victims from the scope of victim assistance. Tolerance discourse, too, though avoiding the 
trap of presenting a stereotyped picture of the victim, can be used to justify interventionist 
policies and security/control mechanisms. Asking for tolerance, the discourse “establishes a 
hierarchy in which some people are marked out as different from the norm, and therefore as 
potential objects of tolerance, whereas others, through their (self-) ascribed ability to tolerate 
that difference, constitute the norm.”312 The state is, then, presented as a neutral arbiter 
between different groups, governing and controlling difference through the very same 
techniques that are used in the security paradigm. 
Finally, the war discourse, as noted earlier, seems to act as some kind of glue between all of 
these other discourses, blurring them in an inevitable way. It suffices to mention the fight 
against THB to enforce this discourse, even if one would do so in a critical context. Besides, 
it is quite difficult not to be willing to combat the horrible practice that is trafficking. Indeed, 
an important consequence of the new kind of war against “indefinite, immaterial enemies” 
is, according to Hardt and Negri, that “[a]ll of humanity can in principle be united against an 
abstract concept or practice”,313 such as THB, marking the re-emergence of the concepts of 
just war and hostis humanis generis that have in the past lead to some very regrettable 
results.314 This birth of a universal mission is reinforced by two other consequences of the 
new kind of war. First, these wars have “no definite spatial or temporal boundaries”, 
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meaning that they can exist anywhere and anytime, and that they have to be “won again 
every day.”315 Secondly, international relations and domestic politics start to intertwine, since 
“[t]he ‘enemy’, which has traditionally been conceived outside, and the ‘dangerous classes’, 
which have traditionally been inside, are […] increasingly indistinguishable from one 
another and serve together as the object of the war effort.”316 Taking all of these elements 
into consideration, it must be concluded that it is quite difficult, whatever one’s intentions 
are, not to be absorbed into this discourse and therefore to act as a conduit of biopower. 
Another connecting element seems to be a commitment to liberalism. The humanitarian 
discourse, lead by feminists, in the case of anti-trafficking, is certainly firmly based on 
liberal values, operating through liberal precepts, such as choice and coercion and utilizing 
human rights “to argue for liberatory ideals around gender, sexuality, and a host of other 
concerns”,317 but the more conservative securitization paradigm and liberalism are not 
opposites either, as one may be tempted to believe, “but the same process”,318 as put by 
Didier Bigo. In fact, Bigo (although concentrating on the immigration, instead of THB, 
discourse) is ready to go as far as to claim that the humanitarian discourse is “a by-product 
of the securitization process.”319 According to him “discourses concerning the human rights 
of asylum seekers are de facto part of securitization process if they play the game of 
differentiating between genuine asylum seekers and illegal migrants, helping the first and 
condemning the second and justifying border controls”,320 which is almost directly 
correlative to the distinction between victims of THB and illegal immigrants.  
A concrete example of how the security and humanitarian discourses may end up 
intertwining in a biopolitical society, without the will or knowledge of the participant in 
these discourses, is provided by Claudia Aradau. She demonstrates how, in order minimize 
the threat of trafficking of the potential victims, NGOs engaged in the humanitarian 
discourse — or the “politics of pity”, as Aradau puts it — emphasize that it is important to 
disentangle background reasons that lead to trafficking and “to consider the predispositions 
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that exist in the personal history of women and girls.”321 In other words, the victims must be 
profiled. This, of course, leads to the examination of the past biographical details of the 
victims of trafficking and to the utilization of expert knowledge. It is usually noted that 
victimization is a repetition of earlier traumas (for example in the family), rendering the 
victims as double traumatized (by THB and earlier traumas).322 We can see here how the 
politics of pity and the politics of risk — as Aradau calls the security approach — start to 
merge. Humanitarians raise the pictures of childhood traumas to evoke pity and to doom the 
criminalizing actions of the state authorities, while unintentionally providing material for the 
biopolitical risk-calculations. “The expert knowledge mobilized by NGOs with the purpose 
of helping trafficking [sic] women”, writes Aradau, “becomes ‘hijacked’ by a politics of risk, 
which is based on risk minimization and containment.”323 The emotional promise of the 
politics of pity is turned into a suspicion of risk. 
We can, therefore, start to observe how biopower silently operates in all parts of the society, 
finding links even between seemingly opposite paradigms. The humanitarian discourse is an 
immensely important counter-power to the biopolitics of the security paradigm, challenging 
governmental mechanisms and control techniques. Yet, if we are not careful, biopower may 
start to control this protest, too, despite our pure intentions and without anyone even 
noticing.  
The same kinds of forces operate also through various everyday practices, decisions, and 
mistakes. There is no doubt, for example, that the anti-THB legislation has been prepared in 
good faith, in order to stop a serious criminal activity and to help its victims. Yet, small 
problems appear here and there in the legislation, because of conflicting political interests 
and differing opinions in the drafting process or other everyday problems. A prime example 
is that of the Trafficking Protocol where the conflicting notions of sex work between the 
structuralist and individualist feminists led into an extremely indeterminate definition of 
THB, as explained in Chapter 2.3.1. When faced with the radical feminist notion of sex work 
as ‘violence’, the liberals, viewing sex work as ‘choice’ had no choice but to make all 
references of sex work disappear, creating a compromise where the link between prostitution 
and trafficking remains undecided, and enforcing the myth of suffering victims of THB. 324 
The myth, the product of all the discourses surrounding THB, is (unsurprisingly) the only 
thing connecting the radicals and the liberals. For the radicals, Doezema explains, 
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the ‘suffering body’ of the sex worker becomes a mythical metaphor for the condition of the 
imagined ‘ideal society’. Her function as a symbol condemns her to suffer; because she must 
suffer, she cannot consent.325   
The liberal feminist approach, on the other hand, 
entails an investment in the continued importance of sexuality as a ‘site of violence’. Thus, the 
continued importance of the suffering, violated body of the sex worker remains even for 
‘consensual prostitution’ supporting feminists. Without this body, the subject of liberal 
feminist concern ‘disappears’.326  
The vagueness in the definition of trafficking and the yet again emerging myth of trafficking 
is then reflected in the national level in overlapping of penal law provisions concerning THB 
with those of pandering. The problematic attempt of the Committee of Legal Affairs for the 
Parliament to distinguish between these provisions by restricting the application of the THB 
provisions for the benefit of pandering provisions is also understandable, taking in 
consideration the more vague definition of THB, the stricter scale of punishment in the case 
of THB, and the principle in dubio pro reo327, extremely important in criminal law. Finally, 
the narrow scope of the Aliens Act, in fear of misuse, is not that surprising, considering the 
clear distinction in peoples’ minds between trafficking, represented by the myth, and 
smuggling.     
All of these small details start to cumulate on the authorities that are trying to make decisions 
on the field. It does not seem very convincing to suggest that the police or the immigration 
authorities would consciously discriminate against victims of trafficking (or at least the 
‘guilty’ ones), but in the pressure of all these discourses, myths and practices, and taking in 
consideration the function, or structural bias, of these authorities (arresting criminals or 
combating illegal immigration), this outcome is quite difficult to escape. This is highlighted, 
of course, in the court decisions regarding THB. There is nothing scandalous in these 
decisions. In fact, almost all of them are reasonably well argued, and legally completely 
plausible. Yet, there are some details, especially in the two cases concerning Estonian 
women forced into prostitution (the first and third Finnish THB cases), that have been the 
object of well pointed criticism in the Finnish academic literature, and lead to quite 
interesting results.  
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Regarding the first case,328 attention has been directed to the weight of consent in the court’s 
decision. Referring to the aforementioned problematic opinion of the parliamentary Legal 
Affairs Committee in Report LaVM 4/2004, the District court stated that the requirement of 
dependence is higher in trafficking than in procuring. Therefore, although the procured 
women were acknowledged to have been in a vulnerable state, the dependent status was not 
met, since the women had known that they would have to offer intimate services when they 
entered Finland, and since they had earned money through prostitution.  The facts that the 
women had not known what their working conditions would be like, that some of the women 
had reported threats of violence against them and against family members, and that their 
freedom of movement was restricted, did not change this interpretation, leading the National 
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings to state that “the District Court did not 
adequately examine the conditions in which the women were selling sexual services.”329 The 
outcome was that “attention was only paid to violations of the rights of the disabled woman, 
who was an injured party.”330  The other women were treated only as witnesses to the case 
and the violations of their rights as evidence of procuring (not as true violations). Nothing 
changed in this respect in the Court of Appeal.331 
In the other case subject to criticism (the third THB, as it has been called in this thesis) the 
topic of discussion has been the Court’s inadequate interpretation of the means and the 
manner of trafficking. In this case,332 the District Court considered that the defendants were 
guilty of procuring, but not of trafficking the Estonian woman whom they had deceived to 
stay in prostitution, against her decision to quit the profession, by falsely promising her a 
different job in Sweden (once she had made them enough money in prostitution). 
Admittedly, the evidence of trafficking in this case was debatable. The National Rapporteur 
on Trafficking in Human Beings, however, considers that the court’s decision was faulty, 
stating that: 
When assessing the case […] the District Court confused the means and the manner of 
committing a human trafficking office. Consequently, it required in its decision the fulfillment 
of two different means, or exploitation of a dependent status and vulnerable state as well as 
deception, and failed to look at the manner of committing the offence defined in the Criminal 
Code, or taking control of another person, recruiting, transferring, transporting, receiving, and 
harboring.333 
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She points out that the court had considered that the defendants had managed to deceive the 
woman into continuing in prostitution by the promises of a job in Sweden, and continues that 
abusing a mistake made by another person also meets the criteria for the means required for 
trafficking.334 She also adds that “[a]ccording to Government proposal 34/2004, the 
dependent status may be caused by family relationships.”335 Since the injured party had 
previously had a relationship with one of the defendants and since the so-called ‘lover boy’ 
recruitment technique336 is widely used in trafficking business, the court should have 
reconsidered its decision. The vulnerable state of the injured party was further emphasized 
by the facts that psychiatrists had confirmed in the court that the injured party was exposed 
to exploitation because of her development and previous experiences and that the defendants 
had rendered the injured part into a poor financial situation by asking her to take fast loans 
that were never paid back. 
These facts were, indeed, taken into consideration by the Court of Appeal that altered the 
District Courts decision and sentenced the defendants for trafficking.337 The Court of 
Appeal’s decision, although a significant improvement, raises some questions, too, however. 
The biggest difference to the District Court decision was that the Court of Appeal found that 
the defendants had subjected the victim to sexual abuse by abusing her vulnerable state and 
dependent status. In coming to this conclusion, the court pointed out the lack of language 
skills of the injured party, her indebtedness and her psychological properties. The decision is, 
then, comparable to the first case dealing with Estonian prostitutes. The confusions of the 
District Court decision are solved, but the decision still seems to be based on the disabled 
state of the victim. In light of the court’s arguments, it seems likely that had the victim not 
been disabled, her initial consent to work in prostitution would have trumped the false 
promises of the traffickers and rendered the offence that of procuring.  
The results and the small problems in the court decisions are extremely interesting from a 
biopolitical perspective. Foucault certainly would not have been surprised to notice that the 
most criticized decisions are those dealing with foreign prostitutes. Especially the first one of 
these is telling. Although there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the judges, the outcome 
was that only the girl that could be deemed completely innocent (and therefore fitting the 
myth of trafficking) was recognized as a true victim of trafficking, while the other women 
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were cast out of governmental protection — as criminals or dangerous risks worthy of 
exclusion, it is implied by the Foucauldian interpretation. In the second case, too, the 
pandered girl became a true victim of trafficking only after the Court of Appeal decided that 
she was psychologically disabled, and therefore innocent in the sense of being incapable of 
consenting to prostitution. Interestingly, in the final sex trafficking case,338 dealing with a 
Finnish girl — easily believed to be someone not engaging willingly in prostitution, and 
already a part of the Finnish national body — no major problems appeared.  
It is also important to remember that only two cases dealing with trafficking to labor 
exploitation have appeared in Finnish courts, even though it is estimated that this practice is 
not that uncommon in Finland. And even in these cases the accusations of trafficking were 
overruled — although a different judgment would have been quite impossible to form, taking 
into consideration the suddenly changed statements of the victim and the witnesses in court, 
in the first case,339 and the lack of clear evidence, in the second.340 In any case, this absence 
of cases, compared to the estimated frequency of the crime, seems to suggest that the myth 
of trafficking is strong also in Finland. Apart from innocent girls, abused in prostitution, 
victims of trafficking remain unidentified and therefore excluded from the society or treated 
as illegal immigrants.   
Perhaps even more alarming, from a Foucauldian perspective, than the debatable court cases, 
however, is the extremely wide margin of discretion afforded to different authorities relating 
to trafficking victims and illegal immigration (exactly what biopower requires to operate 
properly, as we witnessed in the previous Chapter). This problem is also directly connected 
to the operation of the courts, since the courts rely on the authorities to bring them cases and 
evidence. And vice versa: courts can provide legitimization for jurisdictional claims of the 
authorities, and wider social recognition for their measures.341 The facts regarding the 
widening margin of discretion were already dealt with earlier, but to recap, the so-called 
reflection period, that allows victims of trafficking to stay in Finland for a certain amount of 
time, is granted by district police or the border control authorities, not courts, and may be 
suspended by the same authorities if the victim has voluntarily and on his/her own initiative 
re-established relations with the traffickers or if (s)he is considered a danger to public order, 
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security, health or international relations342 — a familiar clause of exception for any jurist 
from countless laws and treaties, but one that cannot be left without a mention form a 
Foucauldian perspective, not least if we combine it with the section of the Aliens Act under 
which an alien may be refused to enter the country if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that he or she may sell sexual services.343 The fact that the same authorities that are supposed 
to indentify victims of THB on the field also grant them the reflection periods and decide on 
their suspension is also worth of attention,344 especially if we recall the facts that neither 
decision is subject to appeal and that there is insufficient information available on what 
ground these decisions should be made.345 The residence permit also depends on the victim’s 
willingness to co-operate with the authorities in the investigation of the crime (unless the 
victim is in a particularly vulnerable position),346 not only raising more questions of the 
margin of discretion of the authorities and their impartiality, but also providing another 
example of the biopolitical control techniques operating in the frames of THB. The 
willingness to cooperate with authorities distinguishes ‘good’ victims from the ‘bad’ ones 
and shapes their subjectivity so that they better fit the mainstream society. Only the most 
vulnerable victims, those that best fit the myth of trafficking, and constitute the smallest risk 
to the society, are saved from this sieve, although it must, again, be stressed that this is 
surely not a master plan of the legislators, but a consequence of the operation of the legal 
system, the will to effectively combat trafficking and the humane wish to protect the most 
vulnerable persons.  
The victim assistance — constituting in large part from psychological treatment, a 
biopolitical control technique par excellence, although certainly very important for 
rehabilitation in many cases — is another area where power is transformed from legislators 
and courts to authorities with wider mandate. The decision to apply the provisions on 
assistance, and to stop applying them, is made by the director of the specific reception 
center,347 assisted by a multi-professional expert group.348 Without any clear standards, the 
decision seems to be wholly in the discretion of these experts. The locations of the victim 
assistance centers, at the outskirts of Joutseno and Oulu (far from the densely populated 
Helsinki metropolitan area, where the main anti-trafficking have their headquarters), also 
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raises some questions. Not only are the centers far from the watchful eyes of other 
authorities and NGOs, but the victims — the potentially dangerous subjects — are also quite 
excluded from the rest of the society.  
There is, then, a clear shift detectable in the case of THB from strict rules to indeterminate 
norms and individual (expert) discretion. As noted earlier, this move to open-ended 
regulation, wide margin of discretion and expert power is absolutely necessary for biopower 
to function, and the most of fundamental element governmentality. It is, therefore, no 
wonder that similar development is detectable outside of Finland, too — everywhere in the 
global North, in fact. In Italy, for example, “irregular migrants, in respect of whom an 
expulsion order has been issued, are kept in centres of assistance and their personal freedom 
is limited, although they have not committed a crime”349, reports Matilde Ventrella 
McCreight. This ambiguity is problematic, she explains, for  
the legislator should specify if illegal immigration is a crime or an administrative infringement. 
If it is an administrative infringement, the legislator should not then transform it into a crime 
by the application of a penalty which is fundamentally penal in nature.350 
To take another example, in Canada, the practice of offering residency on humanitarian 
grounds is, according to Constance McIntosh, “highly discretionary” and is “only granted if 
the Minister of Immigration ‘is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and 
compassionate considerations […]’”351 Similar examples as these two could be found in 
almost any state, but I shall only take one, particularly interesting, example more: the 
privatization of removal centers. According to Mary Bosworth, private companies run more 
than one half of the these centers in UK, a number that is especially interesting in 
comparison to the fact that actual prisons are still mostly in the control of the state. Private 
companies are also often used to move individuals to the centers and to the border.352 The 
message seems quite clear. As Bosworth explains, the state-citizen relationship at the heart 
of the prison management debate does not concern the immigration detention, since the 
detainees in these centers are not citizens of the host country.353 She concludes, therefore, 
that privatization is extremely useful in the case immigration, since “in this corporate take-
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over […] certain elements of state responsibility and more complex questions of justice and 
morality are erased”, and adds that “[t]he particularity of these institutions […] disappears as 
they become just one of a variety of kinds of ‘managed care’.”354  Detention centers “provide 
both a symbolic and a physical exclusion zone [:] Detention excludes non-citizens from the 
society while their appeals are processed or they await removal or deportation.”355 
3.5 Victims of trafficking as homines sacri: Can human rights bring 
salvation? 
Now that we have determined how biopower operates within the trafficking conundrum, it is 
finally time to turn our attention back to the primary concern of this thesis and study whether 
human rights can bring relief to the victims of trafficking. To be able to provide an answer 
this question, we must first locate the victims in the biopolitical terrain. This is more easily 
said than done, however. As the centerpiece of the quagmire, the victims seem to suffer from 
a kind of split identity, as lives necessary of saving to make life live, on the one hand, and 
potential threats worthy of exclusion, on the other. The confusing situation of the victims is 
further highlighted by the fact that it is very difficult to locate a specific source of their 
plight. As we have come to understand, the conventional picture where the victims, protected 
by different humanitarian actors, are discriminated against and mistreated by state actors, 
although true in many parts, is too simplistic to be able to adequately illustrate the whole 
situation. Despite the opposition between the two blocks, it seems that both state authorities 
and the humanitarians are sincerely willing to help the victims, yet they both also 
unintentionally contribute to their hardship. The problem of the victims is not, then,  a 
specific actor or a group of actors, nor is it a troublesome law or treaty or the misapplication 
of such, but rather a complicated web of seemingly harmless or insignificant discourses, 
practices, beliefs, knowledges and mistakes.      
The first problem that the victims willing to invoke their human rights face is, therefore, 
what rights to invoke and, more fundamentally, against whom or what. This dilemma is 
reinforced by the fact that most of these victims are aliens, which of course raises the 
philosophically much studied distinction between human and citizen, sometimes claimed to 
be the “main characteristic of modern law.”356 As Costas Douzinas explains, the aliens 
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do not have rights because they are not part of the state and they are lesser human beings 
because they are not citizens. One is a human to greater or lesser degree because one is or is 
not a citizen to a greater or lesser degree. The alien is the gap between human and citizen. We 
become human through citizenship, and subjectivity is based on the gap, the difference 
between universal man and state citizen. Modern subjectivity is based on those others whose 
existence is evidence of the universality of human nature but whose exclusion is absolutely 
crucial for concrete personhood, in other words, for citizenship.357 
This separation can be claimed to mean that, despite their acclaimed universality, human 
rights have not, in fact, upgraded the nation bound rights of man in any significant way. This 
is framed best by Hannah Arendt, who famously stated that: 
The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such 
broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first 
time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships 
except that they were still human.358 
There is not a long step from this notion to Giorgio Agamben’s concept of homo sacer — a 
term borrowed from archaic Roman law where it described someone who could not be 
sacrificed, yet (s)he who killed this person was not condemned for homicide359 — meaning a 
human being reduced to bare life.360  Bare life is another Agambenian key concept. Although 
used sometimes “as a synonym for biological life as opposed to political life, bare life is 
strictly neither natural nor political life, neither the public life of a citizen nor the natural life 
of an animal”,361 as put by Johanna Oksala. Exemplified by the homo sacer, that could not be 
officially sacrificed, yet did not enjoy any protection from the society, “[b]are life is thus 
something that cannot be clearly demarcated and then simply negated.  It is biological life 
that has been politicised in being included in the political community, but only through its 
exclusion.”362 It is therefore a result of sovereign ban, but instead of distinguishing the inside 
from the outside, “it is the tracing of a threshold between the two, a location where inside 
and outside enter into a zone of indistinction”,363 where the rule and the exception become 
blurred.  
Agamben’s examples of bare life include brain dead patients, refugees detained in refugee 
centers and death row inmates. Adding the unidentified victims of trafficking to the list 
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would not seem to be a very far reach. As aliens whose faith is completely in the hands of 
the authorities with indeterminate powers and nearly unlimited margin of discretion, their 
life is not truly political, for they are not a part of the society (most of the victims, in fact, 
avoid any contact with authorities in fear of being deported or being treated as criminals) or 
have any of the rights granted to citizens, nor is it merely natural animal life since it must be 
rescued from panderers, traffickers or other exploiters, to save the spark of life. It is, rather, 
the politicized form of natural life,364 the bare life in the strict Agambenian sense, politicized 
only through its exclusion. 
If we were to take this Agambenian notion to its logical end, we would have to conclude that 
human rights cannot offer any help to the victims of trafficking. As Agamben states, in a 
similar vein as Arendt, "the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man prove to be 
completely unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterize them as 
rights of the citizens of a state.”365 Rights do not, then, provide universal emancipatory 
potential, according to Agamben, but instead tie bare life to the state: bare life “becomes the 
earthly foundation of the state’s legitimacy and sovereignty”,366 meaning that “the very 
natural life that, inaugurating the biopolitics of modernity, is placed at the foundation of the 
order vanishes into the figure of the citizen […]”367 Declarations of right represent, then, for 
Agamben, “the place in which the passage from divinely authorized royal sovereignty to 
national sovereignty is accomplished.”368 This means that “[r]ights are attributed to man (or 
originate in him) solely to the extent that man is the immediately vanishing ground (who 
must never come to light as such) of the citizen.”369 
This Agambenian notion of bare life and human rights is, then, as Jacques Rancière writes, a 
kind of cul-de-sac in which all doors of escape are already locked in advance.370 As Slavoj 
Žižek explains: 
[Agamben’s] notion of ‘biopolitics’ as the culmination of Western thought ends up getting 
caught in a kind of ‘ontological trap’, in which concentration camps appear as ontological 
destiny: ‘each of us would be in the situation of the refugee in a camp. Any difference grows 
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faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already 
ensnared in the biopolitical trap.371 
We have to conclude, then, that as ingenious as the Agambenian concept of homo sacer is, it 
has the downside of becoming itself an exclusive discourse that prevents progress. Am I not, 
indeed, in picturing the victims of trafficking (following Agamben) in purely negative terms 
— as persons determined by their lack and exclusion — doing exactly what I criticized the 
humanitarians of earlier, that is, rendering, in a sincere will to help, the victims into 
powerless creatures, the perfect (mythical) victims with no capacity of choosing or helping 
themselves?   
Having detected the drawback of Agamben’s theory, we have to, therefore, find a way out of 
this ‘ontological trap’. We could simply deny that the notion of homo sacer applies to the 
victims of trafficking, of course, but this does not make much sense, for the concept seems to 
fit very well, as we already observed. Instead, we should try to understand better the 
situation that these victims are in and try to find escape this way. To do this, we should 
remind ourselves of the Foucauldian notion of power. What is central to this concept of 
power, is that it operates through subjects: it is not possessed, but acts through social 
relationships. As Foucault puts it:  
Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or 
allows to slip away; power is exercised through innumerable points, in the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations.372 
This means that “where there is power, there is resistance”373. We can deduce, therefore, that 
power can only be exercised in relationships between free subjects: relations, where the 
governed are not free, cannot be power relations in their true sense. The zone of indistinction 
producing bare life, exemplified in Agamben’s texts on the Camp, is not, then, a relationship 
of power. Instead, in this zone we witness a relation of violence — a relationship that acts 
“’immediately and directly on others’, whereas a relationship of power ‘acts upon their 
actions’.”374 As Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat explain: 
The camp […] is an example of where power relations vanish. What we have in the 
camps is not a power relation. All we have is the administration of bare life. In the 
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camps, for those inmates who reached the depths, who faced the Gorgon, there were no 
relations of power, only relations of violence.375 
What we need to do, then (as paradoxical as this may seem), is to return the victims of 
trafficking to the sphere of political power relations: “[w]ithout power relations there is no 
possibility of resistance and no freedom.”376 According to Edkins and Pin-Fat, this can be 
accomplished in two ways: either “through a refusal to draw lines” or “through the 
assumption of bare life”.377 Of these two, the latter is out of the scope of this thesis, having 
nothing to do with human rights, but consisting instead of such actions as hunger strikes and 
refugees sewing their mouths, eyes and ears in refugee camps. Moreover, it has already been 
the topic of some excellent studies.378 The former, however — the refusal to draw lines — 
seems to offer some interesting paths (although I might be using it in quite a different sense 
than Edkins and Pin-Fat were suggesting), for is not the raison d’être of universal human 
rights exactly this kind notion of equality? 
Here Rancière’s critique of Agamben and Arendt and his understanding of the “Rights of 
Man” — a term which he, quite confusingly, for an international lawyer, uses as a synonym 
for human rights — becomes relevant again. While Rancière can be criticized of misreading 
Arendt’s critique of human rights and failing to understand the fundamental differences 
between Arendt and Agamben,379 his concept of the subject of the ‘Rights of Man’ can 
challenge the distinction between bare life and political life. Rancière denies that human 
rights are the rights of those without rights. He asserts, instead, that “the Rights of Man are 
the rights of those that have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have 
not.”380 Thus, even though it is an illusion that there would exist rights as ‘given’, or that 
abstract rights could mean the same thing to different people universally, independently of 
material conditions, subjects of rights nevertheless make these rights real by invoking them. 
Or, as Jessica Whyte explains:  
[Rancière] means that those who are deprived of rights — the immigrant, the woman, the 
worker — simultaneously have these rights to the extent that they seize the right that are 
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inscribed as supposedly belonging to them, and use them as the basis for a political 
contestation.381 
What human rights provide, then, for Rancière, is formal equality, something to base 
substantive claims on. As Rancière notes, they are, as written rights, more than just 
“predicates of a nonexisting being.” They are not only “an abstract ideal”, but also “part of 
the configuration of the given”, and therefore provide “a form of visibility of equality”.382 
Human rights open a space for contesting the borders of the political and turn their 
acclaimed subjects (potentially everyone) into political subjects, capable of forming political 
claims — or, as Rancière would put it, ‘political predicates’. “Political predicates”, Rancière 
writes, “are open predicates: they open up a dispute about what they exactly entail and whom 
they concern in these cases.”383 Human rights, enabling political predicates, can therefore, 
despite their inadequacy, transform bare life back into political life — to bring politics into 
the zone of indistinction. With the help of human rights, political subjects “put together the 
world where those rights are valid and the world where they are not. They put together a 
relation of inclusion and a relation of exclusion.” 384 We could, perhaps, claim that bare life 
can use the political spark created by its exclusion (previously of no use to it) to formulate 
human rights claims and therefore find its way back into the political life. 
Through human rights, then, we can accomplish what Edkins and Pin-Fat were demanding: 
we can stop drawing lines. Or rather, we can negotiate the lines again and again with those 
formerly excluded and therefore render them nonexistent. In contrast to Arendt and 
Agamben, and the distinction between the man and the citizen, we can conclude, as Rancière 
does, that: 
There is no man of the Rights of Man, but there is no need for such a man. The strength of 
those rights lies in the back-and-forth movement between the first inscription of the right 
[rights as written and providing formal equality] and the dissensual stage on which it is put to 
test [the politics] […] This is […] why […] the clandestine immigrants [or potential victims of 
trafficking] in the zones of transit of our countries or the populations in the camps of refugees, 
can invoke them. These rights are theirs when they can do something with them to construct a 
dissensus against the denial of rights they suffer.385 
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But now the question raises again: am I not (yet again) doing exactly what the humanitarians 
are doing, that is invoking human rights to somehow miraculously save all those poor souls 
excluded from the society and turned into slaves in the hands of the traffickers, albeit with 
fancier words? This is not the case, however, for there is a slight, although important 
difference between these views. Where the humanitarians are demanding that the victims of 
trafficking should be given these and those (more and more specified) rights (to make them 
wholly human again), my claim is more modest and more comprehensive at the same time. I 
am simply asserting that human rights (in their most general sense, instead of as rights tailor-
made for the victims of THB), and far from salvaging the lives of the victims, can return the 
victims (whoever they may be, exactly) from a certain state of exception back into the realm 
of the political. This is crucial, for the problem with the humanitarian approach is that, 
instead of invoking the potential of human rights in breaking (or endlessly re-negotiating) 
lines and challenging existing categories, such as ‘illegal’ immigrants and prostitutes, it 
accidentally maintains, even fortifies, the distinction between victims of trafficking and 
other, ‘illegal’ immigrants. This distinction is arguable, for unlike the immigrants, the 
victims of trafficking have been moved by force (or so it is claimed, at least), but it is, 
paradoxically, exactly what allows (by accident) the exclusion of all the ‘victims’ that do not 
fit the myth of the victims of trafficking.  
Instead of being transformed political, bare life in the humanitarian approach is dressed with 
the myth of trafficking and expert knowledge (but remains just as bare under these new 
clothes). As we noticed from the example provided by Claudia Aradau,386 the humanitarian 
and security approaches will inevitably merge in biopolitical pressure and the victims of 
trafficking are thus exposed to the governmental techniques and the rationality of risk. What 
all the psychological, statistical and medical techniques, applied in order to help the victims 
and to prevent trafficking, accomplish, instead of emancipation, is the depolitisation of the 
victim. They draw the borders around the zone of indistinction of the bare life. Just like the 
‘sans-papier’ (‘illegal’ immigrant) that is noticed only as a “dark external threat to our way 
of life”, but becomes even more invisible through normalization once legalized, the 
trafficking victim also ceases to exist when (s)he is identified and put under the increased 
disciplinary techniques and surveillance of the victims assistance, and eventually “drowned 
in the indistinct crowd of citizens.”387  What is achieved is, as Rancière would put it, 
consensus instead of dissensus. Where dissensus allows “the dismissal of any difference 
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between those who ‘live’ in such or such sphere of existence, between those who are or are 
not qualified for political life”,388 consensus means “the attempt to get rid of politics” by 
turning conflicts into problems that have to be sorted out by learned expertise” — it means 
“closing the spaces of dissensus by plugging the intervals and patching over the possible 
gaps between appearance and reality or law and fact.”389 In this way, Rancière explains,  
the “abstract” and litigious Rights of Man and of the citizen are tentatively turned into real 
rights, belonging to real groups [like the victims of trafficking], attached to their identity and to 
recognition of their place in the global population […] In this logic, positive laws and rights 
must cling increasingly to the diversity of social groups and to the speed of the changes in 
social life and individual ways of being [and the] law has to become identical to the natural life 
of society.390 
In this process, the political space, created by rights, diminishes and diminishes until rights 
have no use.391 The category of the victims of trafficking is set in stone and the rights that 
start to seem emptier and emptier are soon of no use to them anymore. But they do not still 
become void, for “political names and political places never become merely void.” Instead, 
“the void is filled with somebody or something else.”392 Rancière uses an example where 
rights given to the poor in the Third World are turned into the right of humanitarian 
intervention and therefore returned to the sender: “the disused rights that had been sent to the 
rightless are sent back to the senders.”393 In the case of trafficking the void is filled with state 
authorities and humanitarian NGOs, and so the rights of the victims become the rights of 
well-meaning experts to discipline, treat and govern the victims, providing support to 
Žižek’s statement that the true homo sacer of today is the privileged object of humanitarian 
help, taken care of, but in an extremely condescending way.394    
What makes trafficking such a difficult problem to tackle, is its complex and indeterminate 
nature.  Cases where a girl is abducted completely without her will and transported into a 
brothel to be sexually exploited are, in reality, in a clear minority compared to cases that 
represent the gray area between trafficking and smuggling.  A human right of the victims of 
trafficking, therefore, would (in practice), mean drawing a definite line between those that 
are afforded its protection and those that are excluded from its sphere — and those ‘lucky’ 
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ones that would be defined as victims, and would therefore gain a place in the society, would 
be depoliticized and subjected to all the biopolitical disciplinary techniques that are included 
in the assistance systems (psychological profiling and treatment, testifying against traffickers 
etc.). None of this is to say that the victims should not be afforded assistance, of course, for 
the biopolitical control would in many case seem like a fairly insignificant drawback 
compared to the vital help that the victims receive, and the possibility to formulate their 
claims from the inside, as ‘legitimate’ subjects of the state. But this is true only so far as 
human rights provide a chance to challenge this practice, if need be.  If these rights are 
promoted into human rights, and therefore made equal with those other rights that were used 
to challenge them, we lose the chance of protest, or of politics, and have only “’post-political 
play of negotiation of particular interests.”395  
Human rights are, then, crucially important for the victims of trafficking, but only if we 
resist the temptation to make them the human rights of the trafficking victims. For those that 
are identified as victims of trafficking have already found a place in the society: those that 
are really in need of human rights are those excluded aliens that have not been identified as 
victims of trafficking, and are therefore not in the sphere of the rights of the trafficking 
victims — in other words those that represent the truly universal because they have no place 
(something particular) in the society. What they need are the ‘truly universal’ human rights 
that belong to ‘man as such’, something that makes returns them to the sphere of politics 
(paradoxically) through the claim of universality.  
4. Conclusion 
The translation process of the anti-trafficking campaign into human rights language can be 
described as a success story, the language already starting to get mainstreamed and 
bureaucratized. Trafficking has been recognized as a human rights issue in an international 
treaty, the ECAT, and in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law. In Finland the 
office of National Rapporteur on Trafficking has been established to ensure that the human 
rights of the victims are respected, and in the United States “[m]any organizations within the 
anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking movement are now official partners with U.S. 
government agencies.”396 There are also no reasons to doubt that this progress will continue, 
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human trafficking having become one of the most talked about criminal law and human 
rights problems of the 21st century. 
Like it is always the case, the translation of the anti-trafficking campaign into human rights 
has been a very particular project with its own quirks, surprises and characteristics. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is also directly linked to the expansion of the human 
rights phenomenon in general. The prevalence that the human rights language has received 
in general has been a huge factor behind the success of the human rights approach to 
trafficking, providing unexpected possibilities, on the one hand, but also forcing the process, 
on the other. The mainstreaming of the human rights language and policies has allowed 
human rights and feminist organizations to gain a foothold in global governance and embed 
their human rights aims with legislative and policy-making processes. Yet, simultaneously, 
the ability to translate one’s claims into human rights language has become a vital condition 
for various activists, organization and movements, guiding their actions.  
The reasons behind the translation process and its success are, therefore, manifold — 
although we should not lose sight of the fact that the cohesive element linking projects in 
different environments from academic circles to grass root activism has been the will to 
challenge oppressive practices and to alleviate the suffering of the victims. But this was not 
the only main question that I set for myself in the Introduction. Perhaps the more 
fundamental question was, whether human rights are able to provide help for the victims of 
trafficking, and if so, how? 
So far there is, unfortunately, little evidence that the changed state policies would have had 
much impact on the field in the form of court practice or altered standards of activity of state 
authorities, at least in the concrete case of Finland that provided most of the material for my 
case study. This observation raises some worries, for although the bureaucratization of 
human rights is absolutely necessary for their more effective implementation and fluent 
application, there is the risk that if it does not actually increase the position of its alleged 
subjects in any significant way, it may become an empty governmental practice, a rhetorical 
tool for biopower and post-political negotiations, echoing Costas Douzinas’ bleak 
prophecies. But not too much should be read into this yet, however, for it is impossible to 
draw any far-reaching conclusions, taking in consideration that the human rights approach 
has been mainstreamed only very recently, and by a limited sphere of actors. Besides, as we 
came to notice, human rights can prove to be of crucial importance to the victims of 
trafficking even if their application were entangled with biopolitical practices. Having been 
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profiled as risks to the society, the victims seem to be made invisible by a nearly 
inprenetable net of biopolitical practices and discourses, and therefore deported, or simply 
excluded from the society. In this state of invisibility, the life of the victims becomes bare 
life, included in the political community only through its exclusion, and represented by the 
homo sacer who could not be sacrificed, yet did not enjoy any protection from the society. In 
this space, producing bare life, all power relations vanish, and only relations of violence 
remain. In order to escape, human rights become absolutely vital. As Jacques Rancière and 
Slavoj Žižek have demostrated, human rights can, through their universality and  formal 
equality, provide bare life the tools to formulate political claims and therefore return to the 
sphere of power and politics. 
But returning to the sphere of power and politics does not mean that we have espcaped 
biopower, of course. At this point the question rises, however, whether it is necessary to 
escape biopower, as long as we can prevent ourselves from being excluded by it. Indeed, in 
The Matrix, one of the revolutionaries is ready to betray the others in exchange of being 
plugged back into the Matrix. After having lived exluded from the ‘society’ (the Matrix) — 
experiencing the life of a homo sacer, we could say — the traitor no longer cares, whether 
his life is, in reality, fully controlled, as long as he can once again ‘enjoy’ the benefits that 
the Matrix produces. His only conditions are that he does not want to remember anything 
from his former life and that he is someone rich and important — “like an actor”. But then 
again, if our question was, whether human rights are useful for the victims of trafficking, 
leaving things to this does not seem very satisfactory (being returned to the sphere of politics 
does not mean that one becomes ‘an actor’, after all), even if it means that human rights have 
not become useless for the victims. If the victims get their voices heard, only to get deported 
still after court cases or other official measures, since they do not fit the stereotypical picture 
of the ‘true’ victim of trafficking, created by biopolitical practices, the advancement seems 
very little indeed from their perspective (although it might be a fairly large step from a 
theoretical one). Worse yet, human rights can lose their protest function in the process and 
become simply tools for balancing and negotiating interests, i.e. standard bureauracy, that do 
not add anything to the process, but at best “obscure the political nature of the task.”397 They 
give the false picture that something is actually happening. 
It has been my argument throughout this thesis that we are, indeed, facing this kind of 
danger.  Human rights can be a critically important tool from the victim’s perspective, but if 
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we establish a specific human right for the victims of trafficking, we simultaneously draw a 
line that separates those that enjoy the protection of this right from those others that are 
excluded from its sphere. Since the most fundamental problem regarding anti-trafficking 
measures is that victims are not identified, this is a serious drawback. Instead of radical 
changes, we simply reinforce the existing situation, give the (false) impression that 
significant steps forward have been taken, and legitimize the measures of the authorities. The 
application of such a right also necessarily depends on expert knowledge, considering how 
difficult it is to identify the victims of trafficking, entangling trafficking with biopolitical 
practices. Furthermore, the right to remain in the destination country, aboslutely vital for 
many trafficking victims, seems to come with a heavy price for those that are identified as 
victims of trafficking, subjecting them to intensified surveillance and disciplinary 
techniques. Forcing victims to testify against traffickers and otherwise cooperate in the 
investigation of the crime is the clearest example, and one that has rightly been the object of 
serious criticism by the advocates of the human rights approach. But such elements are 
detectable in other measures, too, even ones that are simultaneously of extreme importance 
to the victims. Since the victims are, as a result of the pervasiveness of  the myth of 
trafficking, pictured as helpless, traumatized persons, they are subjected to all sort of 
treatment and profiling, and sometimes even confined into institutions (such as the victims 
assistance centers in Finland). These assistance measures may, indeed, prove to be very 
useful, even necessary, in many situations, but when they depend on the discretion of 
experts, instead of the will of the victims, and are applied nearly automatically to all victims, 
they start to seem more and more like disciplinary techniques, intended to shape the victims 
so that they fit the needs of the biopolitical society. It is as if we made the victims homines 
sacri in order to control them; as if we had not learned anything from the example of 19th 
century England. As Claudia Aradau puts it: 
If human rights have become  the rights of those that are too weak or too oppressed to 
actualize and enact them, they are not ‘their’ rights. They are deprived of political agency; the 
only rights are our rights to practice pity and humanitarian internventions. [Trafficking] 
Victims are therefore divorced from the very possibility of political agency , turned into 
spectral presences on the scene of politics.398 
We face, therefore, a paradox. Human rights as universal and formally equal are a vital tool 
for the victims in resisting biopower — not because they reflect some divine power  or the 
core of humanity (at least in their written form), but because they provide us the means to 
challenge power. Yet, every time the victims invoke their rights, they set in motion  
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biopolitical practices: every time time a trafficking case is processed by authorities, or a new 
trafficking treaty drafted, the myth of trafficking is reinforced.  Futhermore, when we go 
through the process, we accept the existing rules and institutions concerning trafficking. 
Human rights can, therefore, as put by Wendy Brown, “mask, by depoliticizing, the social 
power of institutions […and organize…] exploitation and regulation, thus functioning as a 
modality of […] biopower.”399 
So, what are we to conclude, then? Should we simply discard the human rights approach, 
because of this paradox? This would seem counterproductive. Human rights have been 
charged with such energy that it would be foolish not to take advantage of it. They have, 
after all, fueled countless (often victorious) emancipatory struggles, and have already shown 
promise in the case of trafficking, as well. It seems reasonable to conclude, instead, that the 
phrase “[h]uman rights are like love, both necessary and impossible”,400 provided by Martti 
Koskenniemi, fits the special case of anti-trafficking campaign, too. We have, therefore, only 
one possibility: to hold on to rights, but to engage with them critically. We must resist the 
ideological temptations that more human rights make everything good and ponder every 
decision carefully. Human rights must be approached as a useful, yet dangerous tool. Man is 
free, after all, not because we have rights, but “because the being of man precedes politics, 
citizenship and rights.”401 We need, therefore, an “ethic of critical engagement with human 
rights, with-in and against human rights, in the name of an unfinished humanity”:402 a never-
ending cycle of protest, activism and critique for the continuous interrogation of the limits of 
the human of rights. Perhaps through this process we can approach, step by step, the raw 
emancipatory potential that human rights promise, and make finally the problematic status of 
‘victim of trafficking’ lose its meaning from the trafficked, smuggled or migrated person’s 
perspective. 
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